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THE NEW HOUSING SEGREGATION:
THE JIM CROW EFFECTS OF
CRIME-FREE HOUSING ORDINANCES
Deborah N . Archer*
America is profoundly segregated along racial lines . We attend separate
schools, live in separate neighborhoods, attend different churches, and shop
at different stores . This rigid racial segregation results in social, economic,
and resource inequality, with White communities of opportunity on the one
hand and many communities of color without access to quality schools, jobs,
transportation, or health care on the other . Many people view this as an unfortunate fact of life, or as a relic of legal systems long since overturned and
beyond the reach of current legal process . But this is not true . On the contrary, the law continues to play a profound role in creating and legitimizing patterns of racial segregation all across America . Crime-free housing ordinances
are one of the most salient examples of the role law plays in producing and
sustaining racial segregation today . They are, in this respect, a critical mechanism for effectuating the new housing segregation .
Crime-free housing ordinances are local laws that either encourage or require
private landlords to evict or exclude tenants who have had varying levels of
contact with the criminal legal system . Though formally race neutral, these
laws facilitate racial segregation in a number of significant ways . This is the
first article to explain precisely how they do so . The Article contends that
crime-free housing ordinances enable racial segregation by importing the racial biases, racial logics, and racial disparities of the criminal legal system into private housing markets . While scholars have examined the important role
local laws played in effectuating racial inequality, they have not paid attention to crime-free housing ordinances . In addition to foregrounding how
crime-free housing ordinances reinforce and perpetuate racially segregated
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communities, this Article proposes an intervention: a “segregative effects”
claim, an underutilized cause of action under the Fair Housing Act of 1968,
to challenge this segregative impact . While this intervention would not end
the pervasive nature of housing segregation across the United States, it could
eliminate at least one of the causes of this persistent problem: a body of law
whose formal race neutrality has obscured its racially segregative effects .
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INTRODUCTION
Crime-free housing ordinances and programs are part of the expanding
web of zero-tolerance policies adopted by private landlords and public housing authorities. These policies ban renting to individuals with a criminal history or allowing those individuals to live with their families. 1 In many cases,
they bar and expel people from rental housing without consideration for the
amount of time that has passed since the conviction, the nature of the underlying conduct, the actions of a formerly incarcerated person postconviction,
or the preexisting racial and class disparities in the criminal legal system.
Take the story of Melvin Lofton. At the age of twenty, Mr. Lofton was convicted for burglary and theft. Today, at the age of fifty-one, Mr. Lofton has
been out of prison for over twenty years. Yet his conviction makes it extremely difficult to find housing on his own. 2 Or, consider the story of a New
York mother threatened with eviction after her fifteen-year-old son was
“banned” because of an arrest for marijuana possession. 3 These stories are
not unique. Across the country, people involved in the criminal legal system
and their families are being squeezed out of various housing markets. At
best, many of these people find themselves with one option: to live in poor
communities of color already struggling with a shortage of affordable housing and the impact of high concentrations of residents with criminal records.
The adoption of crime-free housing ordinances and programs (“crimefree ordinances”) is becoming a national trend. According to one estimate,
approximately 2,000 municipalities across forty-eight states have adopted
crime-free housing ordinances. 4 These local ordinances have the purported
goal of stemming crime in rental housing by forcing landlords, either
through mandatory action or seemingly voluntary guidance, to exclude or
evict tenants who have had some degree of contact with the criminal legal

1. EMILY WERTH, SARGENT SHRIVER NAT’L CTR. ON POVERTY LAW, THE COST OF
BEING “CRIME FREE”: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIME FREE RENTAL
HOUSING AND NUISANCE PROPERTY ORDINANCES 2–4 (2013), http://www.povertylaw.org/files
/docs/cost-of-being-crime-free.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Z5N-L6QG] (discussing the features of
crime-free and nuisance property ordinances); Ann Cammett, Confronting Race and Collateral
Consequences in Public Housing, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1123, 1137–38 (2016) (identifying restrictions on housing opportunities as one of the most significant obstacles to successful
reentry); Jesse Kropf, Note, Keeping “Them” Out: Criminal Record Screening, Public Housing,
and the Fight Against Racial Caste, 4 GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 75 (2012).
2. Camila Domonoske, Denying Housing over Criminal Record May Be Discrimination,
Feds Say, NPR (Apr. 4, 2016, 1:14 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/04/04
/472878724/denying-housing-over-criminal-record-may-be-discrimination-feds-say [https://
perma.cc/8UAK-PRS6].
3. Manny Fernandez, Barred from Public Housing, Even to See Family, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 1, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/01/nyregion/01banned.html (on file with the
Michigan Law Review).
4 . Crime Free Multi-Housing: Keep Illegal Activity off Rental Property, INT’L CRIME
FREE ASS’N, http://www.crime-free-association.org/multi-housing.htm [https://perma.cc/
DUG2-EJ9C]. In Illinois alone, over 100 municipalities have adopted crime-free rental housing
ordinances. WERTH, supra note 1, at 1.
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system. As I will explain, while there is no evidence that these ordinances reduce crime, there is reason to believe that they play a role in restricting access to affordable housing and promoting racial segregation.
The impact of crime-free ordinances on racial segregation should be a
matter of great public concern. At a time when America’s population has become more racially diverse, 5 extreme residential segregation on the basis of
race nonetheless persists. 6 The United States has a long and complicated history of racial segregation in housing, enforced through public policies, 7 individual acts of discrimination, 8 and mob violence. 9 The cumulative effects of
this segregation on people of color are profound. Research has consistently
concluded that Black and Latinx people living in racially segregated communities, with the concentrated poverty that often accompanies such segregation, have profoundly limited life opportunities. 10 Residential segregation
affects an individual’s access to quality education, 11 employment opportuni5 . See JOHN R. LOGAN & BRIAN J. STULTS, US2010 PROJECT, THE PERSISTENCE OF
SEGREGATION IN THE METROPOLIS: NEW FINDINGS FROM THE 2010 CENSUS 1–2 (2011),
https://s4.ad.brown.edu/Projects/Diversity/Data/Report/report2.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UYL8WLP] (discussing the growth of communities of color in the United States).
6 . See id . at 9–10 (discussing the persistence of racial segregation between 1980 and
2000 in some metropolitan areas, and the continuation of this segregation in 2010); William H.
Frey, Census Shows Modest Declines in Black-White Segregation, BROOKINGS (Dec. 8, 2015),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2015/12/08/census-shows-modest-declines-inblack-white-segregation [https://perma.cc/62VZ-2DUE] (finding that 2010–2014 census data
identified “continued high levels” of segregation, but also some decline in select parts of the
country); see also SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: HOW RACE AND CLASS
ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM, at XI–XIII (2004) (discussing some of the obstacles standing in the way of integration).
7 . See infra notes 38–53 and accompanying text.
8 . See CASHIN, supra note 6, at XI–XII (discussing the racist attitudes that have stood
in the way of integration); infra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.
9 . See RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW
OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA, at VII–VIII, 41–42 (2017); infra notes 44, 46.
10 . See, e .g ., CASHIN, supra note 6, at 3; TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES:
HOW MASS INCARCERATION MAKES DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE 70 (2007)
(discussing the harms of concentrated disadvantage); ROTHSTEIN, supra note 9, at 186–87 (discussing the fact that young Black people are more likely to live in poor neighborhoods than
young White people); MARGUERITE L. SPENCER & REBECCA RENO, KIRWAN INST. FOR THE
STUDY OF RACE AND ETHNICITY, THE BENEFITS OF RACIAL AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN
OUR EDUCATION SYSTEM: WHY THIS MATTERS FOR OUR DEMOCRACY (2009),
http://www.kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/reports/2009/02_2009_EducationIntegrationBenefitsRepo
rt.pdf [https://perma.cc/39SM-T5PM] (discussing the ways in which socioeconomic and racial
segregation decreases life opportunities); see also I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place,
44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43 (2009) (discussing criminal law and procedure’s role in facilitating segregated spaces).
11 . See Daniel Kiel, The Enduring Power of Milliken’s Fences, 45 URB. LAW. 137, 144
(2013); john a. powell, Living and Learning: Linking Housing and Education, 80 MINN. L. REV.
749 (1996); Aaron J. Saiger, The School District Boundary Problem, 42 URB. LAW. 495, 499–501
(2010) (shedding light on the academic success disparities between schools in neighboring
school districts); Erika K. Wilson, Toward a Theory of Equitable Federated Regionalism in Public Education, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1416, 1418–19 (2014) (discussing the case of Kelley Williams-
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ties, 12 government services, 13 and social capital. 14 Residents of racially segregated communities also experience increased contact with the criminal legal
system—one of the critical drivers of unequal opportunity in America. 15
Poor, isolated, over-policed, and under-resourced communities of color are
a legacy of housing discrimination. 16
Yet, despite the persistent impacts of residential racial segregation, housing discrimination is often perceived as a relic of history, solved long ago
with the passage of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 17 and decades of its enforcement by the government and private citizens. According to this narrative, lingering segregation is largely driven by regrettable but understandable
private choices beyond the reach of the law—rational decisions motivated by
the desire to live in safe communities with high-quality schools, good amenities, and high property values. 18 The narrative concludes that the fact that
safer and more resourced communities happen to be predominantly White

Bolar, an African American mother of two convicted of two felony counts of tampering with
records because she falsified her address to enroll her children into a suburban school).
12 . See Xavier de Souza Briggs, More Pluribus, Less Unum? The Changing Geography of
Race and Opportunity, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY 17, 35 (Xavier de Souza Briggs
ed., 2005); James R. Elliott, Social Isolation and Labor Market Insulation: Network and Neighborhood Effects on Less-Educated Urban Workers, 40 SOC. Q. 199 (1999) (examining how poverty and social networks within a neighborhood affect labor prospects of individuals with lowlower levels of educational training); Katherine S. Newman, Dead-End Jobs: A Way Out,
BROOKINGS REV., Fall 1995, at 24 (explaining the reasons for the stagnation of jobs in inner city
communities).
13 . See Briggs, supra note 12, at 35.
14 . See Claude S. Fischer, Network Analysis and Urban Studies, in NETWORKS AND
PLACES: SOCIAL RELATIONS IN THE URBAN SETTING 19 (Claude S. Fischer et al. eds., 1977); Capers, supra note 10, at 49–52 (discussing the impact of social capital on a person’s opportunities in life); Xavier de Souza Briggs, Bridging Networks, Social Capital, and Racial Segregation in
America 8 (Harvard Univ. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t Faculty Working Paper Series, No. RWP02011, 2003), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/social-capital-and-segregation-raceconnections-and-inequality-america [https://perma.cc/7WHC-NWSP] (summarizing the findings of different studies focused on relationships formed in neighborhoods with different racial
makeups).
15 . See generally Robert J. Sampson & William Julius Wilson, Toward a Theory of Race,
Crime, and Urban Inequality, in CRIME AND INEQUALITY 37 (John Hagan & Ruth D. Peterson
eds., 1995) (showing that the racial disparities in crime among people of different races are due
to structural disadvantages); Capers, supra note 10, at 62–72 (explaining the ways in which the
criminal justice system has been racialized).
16 . See CASHIN, supra note 6, at 96; Jonathan Kaplan & Andrew Valls, Housing Discrimination as a Basis for Black Reparations, 21 PUB. AFF. Q. 255, 255–56 (2007) (arguing that the
history of housing discrimination is partly to blame for current racial inequality); Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, The Fair Housing Choice Myth, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 967, 981 (2012) (arguing that
White residents have wielded significant power in their ability to choose neighborhoods to live
in). See generally ROTHSTEIN, supra note 9 (summarizing the history of housing discrimination
in the United States).
17. Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (2012)).
18 . See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 9, at VII–VIII, XII.
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is mostly a result of historic racial discrimination, not current laws, policies,
or practices. 19
As with many narratives about the end of government-sponsored racial
discrimination, the truth is significantly more complex. Racial segregation
continues to be a problem not simply of history, but of current design. Although the nature of racism in housing continues to change, government policies continue to sustain racial segregation, often working to resegregate
communities that had managed to achieve some level of integration.
Local laws are often more central than federal or state laws to creating
and perpetuating racially segregated neighborhoods. Exclusionary local laws
and policies are among the primary mechanisms used by predominantly
White communities to ward off racial integration. 20 Seemingly race-neutral
local laws have had a profound role in driving systemic racial exclusion and
residential segregation. 21 Exclusionary zoning laws are the paradigmatic example, effectively erecting fences that exclude poor people of color from that
community. 22 But exclusionary localism did not begin or end with exclusionary zoning laws. 23

19 . See Kaplan & Valls, supra note 16, at 258–59 (arguing that housing discrimination is
a central source of racial disparities); Sarah Schindler, Architectural Exclusion: Discrimination
and Segregation Through Physical Design of the Built Environment, 124 YALE L.J. 1934 (2015)
(discussing different city designs and policies that have left negative, long-term effects on
communities of color); Richard Rothstein, Research Assoc., Econ. Policy Inst. & Senior Fellow,
Chief Justice Earl Warren Inst. on Law & Soc. Policy, Univ. of Cal. Berkeley Sch. of Law, Modern Segregation (Mar. 6, 2014), https://www.epi.org/files/2014/MODERN-SEGREGATION
.pdf [https://perma.cc/76YH-HD4P] (“Segregation is now locked in place by exclusionary zoning laws in suburbs where black families once could have afforded to move in the absence of
official segregation, but can afford to do so no longer with property values appreciated.”).
20 . See, e .g ., ROTHSTEIN, supra note 9, at 42; Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries
of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1860–85 (1994) (discussing how local laws and policies have been used to control the makeup of neighborhoods).
21 . See Ford, supra note 20, at 1861; Wilson, supra note 11, at 1418 (identifying the negative effect school district boundaries have on segregation and inequality).
22. Myron Orfield, Land Use and Housing Policies to Reduce Concentrated Poverty and
Racial Segregation, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 877, 878 (2006).
23. Recent examples include ordinances requiring landlords to verify the citizenship
status of rental applicants. See, e .g ., Rebecca Elliott, State Sued over Housing Discrimination
Law, HOUS. CHRON. (Feb. 17, 2017, 9:12 PM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news
/politics/houston/article/State-sued-over-housing-discrimination-law-10941911.php [https://
perma.cc/E9ZX-HCFQ] (discussing Texas’s law preventing localities from passing Section 8
antidiscrimination ordinances); David Hendee, Catch-22 Keeps Fremont from Acting on Controversial Housing Ordinance, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Apr. 12, 2015), https://www.omaha
.com/news/metro/catch--keeps-fremont-from-acting-on-controversial-housing-ordinance
/article_34091da3-ddd3-5643-8076-f474fd328260.html [https://perma.cc/2ZLK-UKWQ] (explaining that the Fremont, Nebraska ordinance requires renters to apply for an “occupancy
license,” which asks them to confirm their citizenship status and requires that those found to
be in the country unlawfully have the license revoked); cf . Adam Belz, Judge Strikes Down Minneapolis Section 8 Protection, STAR TRIB. (June 8, 2018, 9:04 PM), http://www.startribune.com
/judge-strikes-down-minneapolis-section-8-anti-discrimination-law/484998931/
[https://
perma.cc/7VTV-S6HN] (discussing an antidiscrimination ordinance in Minneapolis struck
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Crime-free ordinances are an emerging and increasingly effective tool of
exclusionary localism. Proponents of crime-free housing ordinances, which
have their roots in the law enforcement community and are based on principles of policing, assert that the ordinances will deter criminal activity in a
community by punishing private landlords and tenants for the suspected
criminal activity of residents. 24 The ordinances and programs take various
forms, but all encourage or require landlords in the municipality to take
steps aimed at keeping people with criminal legal system contacts out of
rental housing and, ultimately, out of the municipality altogether. 25
Troublingly, crime-free ordinances extend the reach and impact of these
types of exclusionary policies, moving them from optional to mandatory for
private landlords and stretching the definition of “criminal activity” beyond
any reasonable definition of crime. These ordinances affect people who cannot reasonably be said to pose a threat to the health or safety of other residents. Crime-free ordinances not only block tenants like Mr. Lofton because
of unreasonably long periods of time during which convictions are considered. By casting such a wide net, they also may exclude individuals with convictions for shoplifting, jaywalking, or driving on a suspended license. Even
more disturbing, crime-free ordinances criminalize and exclude people
without any conviction at all: the individual stopped by the police on an almost daily basis because of discriminatory policing or the friends repeatedly
accused of loitering for hanging out in a community park.
There is a long history of using the narrative of Black criminality as a
justification for segregation. 26 Indeed, the assumption of Black dangerousness stubbornly remains a central part of America’s cultural view and a relentless narrative that drives debate and policy ranging from criminal justice
reform to education. Crime-free ordinances fit squarely into this historical
narrative. So it should be no surprise that laws ostensibly motivated by the
desire to keep certain communities “safe” would act as a fence against racial
integration. Racial discrimination and racial disparities in the criminal legal
system are undeniable. By using contact with the criminal legal system as a
tool for exclusion, documented racial biases in policing and the criminal legal system are imported into the private housing market, furthering systemic
racial exclusion and residential segregation.

down by a judge, thereby allowing landlords to continue rejecting applicants using Section 8
vouchers).
24 . See Crime Free Programs: A Brief History, INT’L CRIME FREE ASS’N,
http://www.crime-free-association.org/history.htm [https://perma.cc/SM9Q-CGT4].
25 . See infra Section II.B.
26 . See Brief for the National Black Law Students Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017) (No. 15-8049); GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, THE
BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: THE DEBATE ON AFRO-AMERICAN CHARACTER AND
DESTINY, 1817–1914, at 45 (1987); ROTHSTEIN, supra note 9, at 41–42.
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Study of the issues raised by crime-free housing ordinances is just
emerging in the legal literature. 27 This Article is the first to explore in-depth
the racially exclusionary impact of crime-free ordinances. The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I provides a brief overview of the ways in which exclusionary local laws and policies have contributed to racial disparities and
segregation. My aim is to suggest that crime-free ordinances emerged against
the backdrop of a range of historical practices of predominantly White
communities, who have deployed their local authority as a fence to ward off
racial integration. Part II then turns to crime-free housing ordinances themselves. Here, I offer a critical examination of the nationwide trend of towns
and cities enacting crime-free housing ordinances. Part II focuses particularly on examples from Minnesota and Florida to identify common elements of
these ordinances. Part III explores some of the public policy and civil rights
concerns raised by crime-free housing ordinances. Although crime-free ordinances present a range of troubling issues, this Part will focus on the impact these ordinances may have on policing people of color, the role they
play in advancing a narrative that stigmatizes people with criminal convictions, the racial bias that often motivates their adoption, and the potential
they hold to arm police officers with a new tool for harassment and discrimination. Part IV sets forth the ways that crime-free ordinances combine with
racialized policing and racial disparities in the criminal legal system to perpetuate racial segregation. Finally, Part V argues that the segregative effects
cause of action under the Fair Housing Act should be used to challenge the
cumulative impact crime-free ordinances have in reinforcing or perpetuating
racially segregated communities. A segregative effects claim challenges a policy or practice that harms communities by “creating, increasing, reinforcing,
or perpetuating segregated housing patterns.” 28 In focusing on the community-based impact of housing policies and practices, the segregative effects
provision presents a mechanism to prevent communities from using the racial bias embedded in the criminal legal system to maintain segregation.
I.

EXCLUSIONARY LOCALISM AND RACIAL SEGREGATION

Localism—the delegation of political power to decentralized and autonomous local governmental units—is a foundation of the American political

27 . See Kathryn V. Ramsey, One-Strike 2 .0: How Local Governments Are Distorting a
Flawed Federal Eviction Law, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1146 (2018) (examining crime-free municipal
ordinances as an outgrowth of federal “one-strike” policies); Sarah Swan, Home Rules, 64 DUKE
L.J. 823 (2015) (arguing that home rule authority is increasingly used by municipalities as a
form of third-party policing, governing families and intimate spaces).
28. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed.
Reg. 11,460, 11,468–69 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100); see also Tex. Dep’t
of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523–24 (2015); Robert
G. Schwemm, Segregative-Effect Claims Under the Fair Housing Act, 20 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 709, 713 (2017).
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system. 29 Localism enables residents of a municipality to make decisions on a
range of local policies and the provision of local services. 30 Localism is deeply
rooted in American legal and political culture, with most localities enjoying
considerable autonomy over political, economic, and regulatory concerns. 31
This authority is so institutionalized that we seldom question the exclusionary impact of localism, viewing the resulting community-based inequalities
as the natural order of things. This Part provides a brief overview of localism
and its role in creating and perpetuating residential segregation.
Scholars of local government law have explored the benefits of localized
political power. The theoretical benefits of localism are substantial. They include opportunities for governmental innovation and the potential for increased efficiencies born of local competition for residents. 32 Indeed, local
governments have historically broken new ground in public health, education, sanitation, and infrastructure development. 33 One of the primary justifications for localism is the idea that small units of government facilitate
robust political participation and civic engagement. 34 In essence, the idea is

29 . See Richard Briffault, Our Localism (pt. 2), 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 357 (1990) (discussing how local government law has affected the development of cities); Sheryll D. Cashin,
Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New
Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 1988 (2000) (arguing that localism has helped create segregated
communities); Wilson, supra note 11, at 1425, 1432–33 (discussing the definition of political
decentralization—localism—and its prominence).
30. Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1115 (1996) (“Local government law enables people who live within
these discrete areas to organize themselves into distinct political units and gives those units
power to make decisions with respect to a range of public policies and services.”).
31 . See Richard Briffault, Our Localism (pt. 1), 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1990) (“State
legislatures, often criticized for excessive interference in local matters, have frequently conferred significant political, economic and regulatory authority on many localities.”); Cashin,
supra note 29, at 1998–2001 (explaining that “the values of democratic participation, efficiency,
and community” make localism popular in the United States).
32 . See Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 257 (1993) (discussing the values of local control and decentralization).
33. Briffault, supra note 31, at 15; see ERNEST S. GRIFFITH, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
CITY GOVERNMENT: THE PROGRESSIVE YEARS AND THEIR AFTERMATH, 1900–1920, at 85–99,
216–30 (1974).
34. Cashin, supra note 29, at 1998–2000 (discussing why citizen participation is viewed
as a normative justification for localism); see GREGORY R. WEIHER, THE FRACTURED
METROPOLIS: POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION AND METROPOLITAN SEGREGATION 2–3 (1991);
Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1068–70 (1980) (arguing
that individual participation is an important political value and that such individual involvement can only occur in small political units); Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and
Collective Action in Local Government Law, 86 MICH. L. REV. 930, 930 (1988) (“Participation is
again in the air. Apparently fueled by current debates concerning decentralized power and republican versus pluralist traditions in our political and legal theory, those concerned with political decisionmaking have turned their attention to calls for increased public involvement in
the process.” (footnotes omitted)); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,
64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418–21 (1956) (positing the theory that people elect to live in the community that best provides the resources they desire, and that once they are in that community
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that “citizen participation in governmental affairs is an important political
value that can only be achieved through small units of government because
only through such units is meaningful hands-on participation by individual
citizens possible.” 35 Moreover, people will only participate if they see that
their political efforts will meaningfully affect their daily lives. 36 Accordingly,
the primary focus of individual participation in local governance in most
communities is on issues that affect the private lives of residents—“their
homes, families, privacy and personal security.” 37
The theoretical benefits of local governance do not always measure up to
reality, particularly when it comes to the power of local governments to exclude classes of individuals. Scholars have highlighted the exclusionary potential of local citizens exercising their political power to “protect” their own
communities, critiquing localism as a politically reinforced tool for strengthening social inequalities and perpetuating race and class segregation. 38
Sheryll Cashin has argued that “the values of civic participation and efficiency that undergird localism clash with the values of fairness and equity when
one confronts the real world impact of local autonomy.” 39 As she further explains, “[t]he decentered nature of American governance . . . has given birth
to a systematic practice of exclusion.” 40
Local control includes the power to exclude. 41 Too frequently the authority invested in local governments has been used to exclude residents

they attempt to maintain the status quo of that community); Wilson, supra note 11, at 1425
(“[S]cholars also contend that political decentralization facilitates democracy and democratic
values because smaller local governments are closer to citizens and more readily allow citizens
to participate in the democracy.”).
35. Cashin, supra note 29, at 1998–99; Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism and the Use
of Municipal Bond Proceeds, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1030, 1076–79 (1983) (“Given the distance between electors and elected at the state and national levels, local politics remains the last bastion
of political participation.”); Gillette, supra note 34, at 952 (“[O]nly at the local level [can] the
mass of individuals . . . fully participate and realize their potential.”).
36. Cashin, supra note 29, at 1998–99; Frug, supra note 34, at 1068–70 (“No one is likely
to participate in the decisionmaking of an entity of any size unless the participation will make a
difference in his life.”).
37. Briffault, supra note 29, at 440.
38 . See id . at 440–41 (arguing that the residential concerns of local politics are usually
focused on maintaining homogeneity and protecting against “deterioration,” which is usually
attributed to an influx of lower-income people and people of color); Cashin, supra note 29, at
1988 (“Localism . . . has helped to produce fragmented metropolitan regions stratified by race
and income.”); David D. Troutt, Katrina’s Window: Localism, Resegregation, and Equitable
Regionalism, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1109, 1145–46 (2008); Wilson, supra note 11, at 1420 (discussing
the ways in which localism has bolstered “exclusion and inequality in public education along
the lines of race and class”). See generally Briffault, supra note 31 (discussing the history of localism and how it has been used to facilitate segregation).
39. Cashin, supra note 29, at 1997.
40 . Id . at 1993; see also Briffault, supra note 31, at 41, 57 (discussing the functions and
effects of exclusionary zoning laws).
41. Troutt, supra note 38, at 1146 (“Local control must mean the power to exclude even
more than the power to include . . . .”).
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deemed “undesirable.” 42 Unfortunately, that undesirability is often defined
along racial lines. In this way, localism has been a driver of racial exclusion
and segregation by limiting movement across municipal boundaries. As
Richard Briffault has written, this brand of localism
results in a local politics aimed at the maintenance of class and ethnic homogeneity. Local homogeneity is attained by separate incorporation, often
followed by the adoption of exclusionary land-use policies. Although most
common in affluent areas, exclusion is not the prerogative of the wealthy;
less well-to-do communities are just as concerned about maintaining
community status against the deterioration usually attributed to the influx
of racial and ethnic minorities and poorer people . . . . “[O]ne need only attend a few public hearings on controversial zoning changes in suburban areas to realize that the people consider their right to pass judgment upon
their future neighbors as sacred.” 43

The long history of racially exclusionary localism reaches back to “sundown towns,” which excluded Black people through ordinances and policies,
exclusionary covenants, threats, and harassment by local law enforcement
officers. 44 Hundreds of cities across America have been sundown towns at
some point in their history. 45 Not only were Black people barred from living
in these towns, but Black people who entered the town or were found there
after sunset were subject to harassment, threats, and acts of violence. 46 As

42. Briffault, supra note 30, at 1134; see also Cashin, supra note 29, at 1987 (“Marginalized populations, particularly the minority poor who are regulated to poverty-ridden, central
city neighborhoods, are largely excluded from participating in the favored quarter’s economic
prosperity.”).
43. Briffault, supra note 29, at 441 (quoting RICHARD F. BABCOCK & FRED P.
BOSSELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING 90 (1973)).
44. JAMES W. LOEWEN, SUNDOWN TOWNS: A HIDDEN DIMENSION OF AMERICAN
RACISM 4 (2005) (“Many towns drove out their black populations, then posted sundown
signs. . . . Other towns passed ordinances barring African Americans after dark or prohibiting
them from owning or renting property; still others established such policies by informal
means, harassing and even killing those who violated the rule.”); ROTHSTEIN, supra note 9, at
42.
45. LOEWEN, supra note 44, at 4–7 (revealing that sundown towns have existed almost
everywhere in the country).
46. Id . at 228–29; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 9, at 42 (stating that “police and organized
mobs” enforced policies “forbidding African Americans from residing or even from being
within town borders after dark”). Black people were not the only people driven out of communities by sundown laws and related harassment. For example, in the late 1800s, Chinese people
were driven out of Idaho. LOEWEN, supra note 44, at 51. In 1870, Chinese people constituted
approximately one-third of Idaho’s population. Id. By 1910, almost none remained. Id . In
Gardnerville, Nevada, the town blew a whistle at 6:00 p.m. each day to alert Native Americans
of the need to leave the town by sundown. Id . at 23. And, in parts of Colorado, signs were posted that read, “No Mexicans After Night.” Peter Carlson, When Signs Said ‘Get Out’ in ‘Sundown Towns,’ Racism in the Rearview Mirror, WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/20/AR2006022001590.html
[https://perma.cc/V69V-43AK].
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Richard Rothstein writes, “[s]ome towns rang bells at sundown to warn”
Black people to leave. 47
Other scholars have written extensively about the role that local laws
and policies have played, and continue to play, in creating racially segregated
communities and preserving racial segregation. 48 But it is important to highlight, as one researcher demonstrated, that local political boundaries and
control over entry into the community “facilitate a recruitment and selection
process” that contributes to economic and racial inequality. 49 As citizens use
local authority to shape their daily lives, they too often employ a narrow
conception of self-interest that rests on racial and economic differences. 50
Although localities are creatures of the state and can only exercise power
the state has delegated, states have delegated to localities significant authority
that has been reinforced by the courts. 51 State and federal courts have repeatedly supported strong local government and local control of fundamental
services. 52 A series of Supreme Court decisions in the 1970s affirmed the
power of localities to construct “desirable communities” using devices that
disproportionately exclude people of color and ratified the sanctity of the exercise of local powers within jurisdictional boundaries. 53
47. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 9, at 42.
48 . See, e .g ., id . (discussing the history of laws that have created and helped maintain
segregated communities in the United States); Cashin, supra note 29, at 1988 (arguing that localism has facilitated the creation of segregated communities); Ford, supra note 20, at 1861
(“[A]n important source of segregation and of the isolation and oppression of minorities that
accompany it, is the autonomous municipality that forms a racially homogenous jurisdiction.”); Troutt, supra note 38, at 1145–46; Wilson, supra note 11, at 1418.
49. Cashin, supra note 29, at 1993.
50 . Id . at 2015 (“[F]ragmentation gives effect to and inculcates a narrow conception of
self-interest, one premised on cultural, racial, and economic differences that effectively blinds
citizens to their potential regional allies.”).
51. Briffault, supra note 31, at 7, 100–02 (discussing Supreme Court cases holding that
educational decisionmaking should be done on the local level); Troutt, supra note 38, at 1147
(discussing cases).
52. Briffault, supra note 31, at 1 (“State courts, usually characterized as hostile to localities and condemned for failing to vindicate local rights against the states, have repeatedly embraced the concept of strong local government and have affirmed local [regulatory] power and
local control of basic services.”).
53 . See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)
(sustaining local exclusion of subsidized housing and finding that a community can zone itself
solely for single-family households and refuse to rezone to accommodate a small subsidized
housing project); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (rejecting the right of outsiders to challenge a locality’s zoning, refusing to take a regional perspective on the impact of local zoning
practices, and effectively precluding federal judicial review of most local exclusionary zoning
practices); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (holding that municipalities can
exclude nontraditional households and affirming local zoning power and the right of localities
to exclude potential residents whose presence would be inconsistent with the local vision of
proper community character); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (underscoring the lack
of state derivative liability for local misconduct, rejecting interdistrict busing as a remedy for
unconstitutional segregation in the Detroit school system, and concluding that the state and its
school districts stood on independent legal footings); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodri-
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Through exclusionary housing policies that masquerade as race-neutral
principles of rational planning and home rule, homogeneous municipalities
can, and do, act on their worst biases. 54 Many local communities exercise
their local power to relegate poor people of color to marginalized, resourcestarved neighborhoods, away from the economic prosperity of their own
communities. 55 For centuries, local governments have enacted land use, zoning, and tax policies that prevent poor or minority residents from being able
to move into those communities. While many commentators point to zoning laws as the paradigmatic example of exclusionary localism, other examples abound. In examining the impact of Hurricane Katrina on racial
segregation in New Orleans, David Troutt highlighted powerful examples of
the exclusionary exercise of local authority in the aftermath of the hurricane.
Three days after Hurricane Katrina, Jefferson Parish armed police officers
closed the Gretna Bridge to Black evacuees desperately fleeing flooded New
Orleans. 56 In addition to the incident on the Gretna Bridge, in the days after
Hurricane Katrina, predominantly White St. Bernard Parish enacted an ordinance preventing homeowners from renting out their homes to anyone
other than a blood relative without a permit to prevent the relocation of
Black New Orleanians seeking new homes. 57 Similarly, following the hurricane, Jefferson Parish passed a resolution barring construction of any multifamily housing with the use of state-issued tax credits 58—a move that was
both racially and economically exclusionary.
Localism has a causal connection to racial segregation and concentrated
poverty. Arguably, localism is “the primary agency behind resegregation,
without which it would neither have been accommodated nor sustained.” 59

guez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that significant differences in spending, taxing, and educational quality between local school districts based on delegation of responsibility for school
funding to public schools of unequal wealth was not a sufficient basis for invalidating the
school finance system).
54 . See PAUL KANTOR, THE DEPENDENT CITY REVISITED: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL POLICY 164 (rev. & updated ed. 1995); Cashin, supra note
29, at 1993 (citing one study finding that the desire for racial exclusion more strongly influenced local law than did the desire for better services and lower taxes); Troutt, supra note 38, at
1166 n.228.
55. Cashin, supra note 29, at 1987 (“Marginalized populations, particularly the minority
poor who are regulated to poverty-ridden, central city neighborhoods, are largely excluded
from participating in the favored quarter’s economic prosperity.”).
56. Troutt, supra note 38, at 1110.
57. Bill Quigley, Editorial, Eighteen Months After Katrina, TRUTHOUT (Feb. 27, 2007),
http://www.nathanielturner.com/eighteenmonthsafterkatrinabillquigley.htm
[https://perma.cc/437W-LV7J]; see also Angela A. Allen-Bell, Bridge over Troubled Waters and
Passageway on a Journey to Justice: National Lessons Learned About Justice from Louisiana’s
Response to Hurricane Katrina, 46 CAL. W. L. REV. 241, 266–68 (2010) (noting that the Crescent City Bridge was also blocked off so that individuals, most of whom were African American, seeking refuge from the floodwaters could not enter Jefferson Parish).
58. Quigley, supra note 57.
59. Troutt, supra note 38, at 1146.
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One scholar pointedly called localism the modern successor to legal racial
segregation. 60
II.

THE RISING TIDE OF CRIME-FREE ORDINANCES

Crime-free ordinances are a step in the evolution of exclusionary localism. 61 Though the ordinances vary in form and force, their common theme
is keeping “undesirable” people out of rental housing. At the voluntary end
of the spectrum, a municipality may offer a certification program for rental
properties, which allows landlords to advertise their properties as “crime
free” if the landlords or property managers attend a training session and take
measures the municipalities claim will improve the safety of their properties,
such as conducting criminal background checks. 62 At the mandatory end,
these ordinances make alleged criminal activity a violation of the rental
agreement and effectively allow police officers to decide (1) whether a potential tenant’s criminal history disqualifies him from rental housing in the
community, or (2) whether a tenant must be evicted because of alleged criminal activity, which requires revocation of a landlord’s authorization to rent
her property for failing to act on those police determinations. 63 This Part
discusses the regulatory architecture of crime-free housing ordinances and
contextualizes the problems they pose. It starts by laying out the history of
crime-free ordinances and continues by describing the standard provisions
of the ordinances using specific examples.

60 . Id . at 1115.
61. Not surprisingly, the adoption of crime-free ordinances is not limited to White
communities. Majority-minority communities, like Savannah, Georgia, and Dallas, Texas, have
also adopted crime-free ordinances or programs. DALL. POLICE DEP’T, NUISANCE ABATEMENT
ORDINANCE UPDATE (2017), https://dallascityhall.com/government/Council%20Meeting%20
Documents/pscj_3_nuisance-abatement-ordinance-update_combined_102317.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/KFZ9-L7YP]; Rachel Goodman, Savannah Police Suspend Its Discriminatory ‘Crime
Free Housing Program,’ ACLU (Feb. 1, 2018, 2:30 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/racial-justice
/race-and-criminal-justice/savannah-police-suspend-its-discriminatory-crime-free
[https://
perma.cc/JR2W-U5NW]; Naheed Rajwani, Dallas Police Can Now Shame Property Owners
Who Tolerate Crime with a Sign, DALL. NEWS (Dec. 13, 2017), https://
www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/2017/12/13/dallas-police-can-now-shame-property-ownerstolerate-crime-sign [https://perma.cc/7J3L-MFM5]. This subset of crime-free ordinances is
part of its own trend. Communities of color have often adopted or endorsed the racially biased
programs and practices of other jurisdictions with the hope of creating safer communities for
themselves, often with devastating consequences for their own members, particularly Black
men. See, e .g ., JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK
AMERICA (2017) (exploring how majority-Black communities endorsed criminal justice policies that disproportionately impact Black men).
62 . See, e .g ., WILLIAM D. GORE, SAN DIEGO CTY. SHERIFF’S DEP’T, SAN DIEGO COUNTY
CRIME FREE MULTI-HOUSING PROGRAM: KEEPING ILLEGAL ACTIVITY OUT OF RENTAL
PROPERTY, at v, 14–16 (2007) [hereinafter SAN DIEGO COUNTY CRIME FREE MULTI-HOUSING
PROGRAM], http://www.sdsheriff.net/documents/cfmh_manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9SG23J5]; infra notes 135–155 and accompanying text.
63 . See, e .g ., FARIBAULT, MINN., CODE § 7-42 (2018).
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A. History of Crime-Free Ordinances
Crime-free ordinances have their roots in the law enforcement community and are historically police-sponsored programs. 64 The first programs

64 . See Crime Free Programs, supra note 24. Municipalities have often adopted chronic
nuisance ordinances hand in hand with crime-free municipal ordinances. Chronic nuisance
ordinances classify a broad range of tenant activities, ranging from noise violations to contact
with the local police department, as a nuisance and incentivize or require landlords to evict
tenants who engage in those activities. See NYCLU & ACLU, MORE THAN A NUISANCE: THE
OUTSIZED CONSEQUENCES OF NEW YORK’S NUISANCE ORDINANCES 6 (2018), https://
www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/nyclu_nuisancereport_20180809.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DB4M-E95K] (“Nuisance ordinances are local laws that allow a city to label a
property a nuisance when it is the site of a certain number of police responses or alleged nuisance conduct, a category that can include assault, harassment, stalking, disorderly conduct,
city code violations, and much more.”). These ordinances seek to label rental properties as a
nuisance where they have surpassed a threshold of contact with the local police department.
Because chronic nuisance ordinances may penalize tenants for police visits to rental property,
whether called by the tenant or a third party, they raise distinct issues for crime victims and
domestic violence survivors. See, e .g ., WERTH, supra note 1, at 8–9 (“By linking law enforcement’s activity at a property with the possibility of eviction of the tenants and/or penalties
against the landlord, ordinances can actually deter tenants, landlords, and concerned citizens
from reaching out to the police . . . .”); Erik Eckholm, Victims’ Dilemma: 911 Calls Can Bring
Eviction, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/17/us/victimsdilemma-911-calls-can-bring-eviction.html [https://perma.cc/9M3J-KVR8] (telling the story of
Lakisha Briggs, who was afraid to call police on her abusive boyfriend because she had been
warned that her landlord would be forced to evict her if she called the police again); Julian
Spector, Get Abused, Call 911, Get Evicted, CITYLAB (Nov. 13, 2015), https://www.citylab.com
/equity/2015/11/get-abused-call-911-get-evicted/402709/ [https://perma.cc/KLB7-Y8LL] (noting that victims of domestic abuse are one group of people who may call 911 frequently). To
date, the primary focus of challenges to crime-free and nuisance ordinances has been the way
these laws punish landlords and tenants for calls for police assistance and the impact on vulnerable individuals, particularly survivors of domestic violence and people with disabilities.
See, e .g ., Complaint, Watson v. City of Maplewood, 2018 WL 2184347 (E.D. Mo. May 11, 2018)
(No. 4:17-01268-JCH) (challenging an ordinance that authorized the revocation of a resident’s
occupancy permit due to requests for police assistance with domestic violence issues or because of crimes occurring on the property); Complaint, Markham v. City of Surprise, No. 2:1501696-SRB (D. Ariz. Aug. 27, 2015) (challenging a municipal ordinance pressuring landlords
to evict a tenant if the tenant calls the police more than four times in thirty days or for crimes
occurring at the property); Complaint, Briggs v. Borough of Norristown, No. 2:13-cv-02191ER (E.D. Pa. Apr. 24, 2013) (challenging a municipal ordinance under which a domestic violence victim was facing eviction because she requested police protection from an abusive exboyfriend); Bd. of Trs. of the Vill. of Groton v. Pirro, 58 N.Y.S.3d 614 (App. Div. 2017) (challenging a nuisance law that made landlords liable if they accumulate enough “points” under
the ordinance); see also Vicki Been & Leila Bozorg, Spiraling: Evictions and Other Causes and
Consequences of Housing Instability, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1408, 1432 (2017) (reviewing
MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY (2016)) (discussing impact of local nuisance ordinances on vulnerable populations and the risk of unfair
evictions). Advocacy on behalf of those two groups led the Department of Housing and Urban
Development to issue guidance on the application of the Fair Housing Act to local nuisance
and crime-free ordinances against crime victims and people in need of emergency services. See
U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL GUIDANCE ON
APPLICATION OF FAIR HOUSING ACT STANDARDS TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF LOCAL NUISANCE
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were created by the International Crime Free Association (ICFA), an organization founded in 1992 by a member of the Mesa Police Department in Arizona. 65 The stated goal of the ICFA is to use “law enforcement based crime
prevention” 66 to keep illegal activity, and the tenants believed to bring it, off
of rental property. 67 In practice, the work of the ICFA has been to spread the
adoption of crime-free ordinances across the United States and create a web
of communities unwelcoming to outsiders, whether or not those individuals
have had any meaningful involvement with the criminal legal system and
whether or not those individuals pose an actual threat to the safety of the
community.
To promote its vision of a crime-free community, ICFA offers nine
“crime free programs,” including distinct programs for multi-housing, 68
rental homes, mobile homes, condominiums, and motels. 69 At the core of
the crime-free programs is a partnership between local law enforcement
agencies and landlords, with the program being implemented under the supervision of local law enforcement. 70 The ICFA offers resources and information to rental property managers or owners and individual officers or
police departments interested in implementing its crime-free program, including crime-free training modules 71 and model language for lease addenda. 72 ICFA’s program consists of three phases—landlord and management
training, police officer inspection and certification of the property, and inclusion of a crime-free lease addendum—and a rental property can only be
certified as crime free upon completion of all three phases of the program. 73
The ICFA advertises the benefits of a fully certified rental property as reduced crime, reduced exposure to civil liability, and a stable resident base. 74
The ICFA has a pronounced focus on drugs and gang activity in rental
properties, warning, “[w]hen drug criminals and other destructive tenants
operate out of rental property, neighborhoods suffer and landlords pay a

AND CRIME-FREE HOUSING ORDINANCES AGAINST VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
CRIME VICTIMS, AND OTHERS WHO REQUIRE POLICE OR EMERGENCY SERVICES (2016).

OTHER

65 . See Crime Free Programs, supra note 24.
66 . Crime Free Programs: Keep Illegal Activity off Rental Property, INT’L CRIME FREE
ASS’N, http://www.crime-free-association.org/index.html [https://perma.cc/2CL2-HKES].
67 . See Crime Free Multi-Housing, supra note 4.
68. The ICFA uses the term multi-housing to refer to apartment complexes. See id .
69 . Crime Free Programs, supra note 66.
70 . Id .
71 . Upcoming Instructor Trainer Workshop, INT’L CRIME FREE ASS’N, http://www.crimefree-association.org/workshop-2017.htm [https://perma.cc/BW52-LXBT].
72 . Crime Free Association Site Index: Keep Illegal Activity off Rental Property, INT’L
CRIME FREE ASS’N, http://www.crime-free-association.org/site_index.htm [https://perma.cc/
8DSX-BBD7].
73 . Crime Free Multi-Housing, supra note 4.
74 . See id .
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high price.” 75 The specific harms identified by the ICFA include a decline in
property values, with the activity of gangs affecting the reputation of the entire neighborhood; property damage resulting from abuse, retaliation, and
police raids; civil penalties as the result of seizure; and fear and frustration
from dealing with “dangerous and threatening” tenants. 76 The Crime Free
Multi-Housing Program (CFMH) is aimed at apartment complexes. 77 According to the ICFA, the CFMH is ground zero in the fight to keep rental
housing safe; the ICFA believes that illegal activity in rental housing migrates
from apartment complexes to condominiums and single-family rental
homes. 78 The advertised benefits of adopting this program include a stable
and satisfied tenant base, reduced police calls for service, lower maintenance
and repair costs, reduced exposure to civil liability, and increased personal
safety for tenants, landlords, and property managers. 79
B. Standard Provisions
The principles and goals of the ICFA’s Crime Free Multi-Housing Program have been adopted, largely verbatim, by municipalities around the
country. 80 There are four common provisions found in many of these ordinances: (1) licensing programs and mandatory landlord training programs;
(2) a crime-free database or background screenings; (3) a crime-free lease
addendum; and (4) an enforcement scheme that encourages eviction and exclusion. As adopted, these ordinances compel private landlords to reject tenants deemed unsuitable by the municipality and stretch the definition of
“criminal activity” beyond any reasonable definition of crime. These ordinances bar people who cannot reasonably be said to pose a threat to the
health or safety of other residents.
1.

Rental Housing Licensing Programs

Many communities around the country have general rental housing licensing programs with the goal of protecting public health, safety, and welfare of tenants, but not all are packaged with a crime-free ordinance. General

75 . Id .; e .g ., Crime Free Multi-Housing Program, SARTELL MINN., http://
www.sartellmn.com/crime-free-multi-housing-program [https://perma.cc/DAM4-QCWT].
76 . Crime Free Multi-Housing, supra note 4.
77 . Id .
78 . Crime Free Rental Housing: Keep Illegal Activity off Rental Property, INT’L CRIME
FREE ASS’N, http://www.crime-free-association.org/rental_housing.htm [https://perma.cc
/8FUU-X9HS].
79 . Crime Free Multi-Housing, supra note 4.
80 . Id . (“The International Crime Free Multi-Housing Program has spread to nearly
2,000 cities in 48 U.S. states . . . .”). Municipalities that do adopt these crime-free ordinances
will often adopt principles from the CFMH program and at times even verbatim language provided by the ICFA. This makes it difficult to divorce crime-free ordinances from the CFMH
program.
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rental housing licensing programs often require the identification of a local
contact person, municipal inspection of rental units and common areas, and
provision of basic safety and living standards. 81 In these communities, renting a dwelling without a license is illegal. 82 Crime-free ordinances typically
are passed as part of a larger rental housing licensing program for all landlords and property managers engaged in residential renting in the municipality, and they require compliance with the crime-free ordinance provisions
in order for landlords to obtain or maintain their residential operator’s license. 83
Municipalities with crime-free programs often make rental housing licenses contingent upon participating in some variation of a landlord or
property manager training program. 84 These programs are usually modeled
after the CFMH training programs. 85 The training packet used by CFMH establishes guidance on everything from “Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design” 86 to improving landlord relationships with responding
police officers. 87 For example, in San Diego—a program that is modeled on
the CFMH and Mesa, Arizona programs—the training program is an eighthour course taught by lawyers, police officers, and fire personnel. 88 The
training program covers the following topics: (1) crime prevention through

81 . See, e .g ., Residential Rental Licenses, CITY OF REHOBOTH BEACH, https://
www.cityofrehoboth.com/%3Cnolink%3E/residential-rental-licenses [https://perma.cc/TK8X35H6]; Residential Rental Licensing Program, CITY OF NEW HAVEN, https://
www.newhavenct.gov/gov/depts/lci/rental_property/residential_rental.htm [https://perma.cc/
TN83-6KWY]; Rental Licensing, ROSEVILLE MINN., https://www.cityofroseville.com/
3188/Rental-Licensing [https://perma.cc/Y85F-CZAJ]; Rental Housing Program, CITY OF
BOWIE MD., https://www.cityofbowie.org/625/Rental-Housing-Program [https://perma.cc/
4DLD-T2VB]; Rental Housing License, INVER GROVE HEIGHTS, https://www.invergrove
heights.org/655/Rental-Housing-License [https://perma.cc/CZX4-KGTM]; Rental License Application, CITY OF COVINGTON, http://www.covingtonky.gov/forms-documents/view/rentallicense-application [https://perma.cc/43CG-FY5R].
82 . See sources cited supra note 81.
83 . See, e .g ., SCHAUMBURG, ILL., CODE § 99.10.05(A) (2015); FARIBAULT, MINN., CODE
§ 7-42 (2017); LAS VEGAS, NEV., CODE § 6.09.020(A) (2012).
84. E .g ., SCHAUMBURG, ILL., CODE § 99.10.05(A) (2015); LAS VEGAS, NEV., CODE
§ 6.09.020(A) (2014).
85. In fact, a number of training manuals available on police department websites contain a copyright page establishing that the material is taken from the ICFA. See, e .g ., LAS VEGAS
METRO. POLICE DEP’T, LAS VEGAS CRIME FREE MULTI-HOUSING PROGRAM: LANDLORD
TRAINING MANUAL, at i (2013) [hereinafter LAS VEGAS CRIME FREE MULTI-HOUSING
PROGRAM]; SAN DIEGO COUNTY CRIME FREE MULTI-HOUSING PROGRAM, supra note 62.
86 . Crime Free Multi-Housing, supra note 4; see also SAN DIEGO COUNTY CRIME FREE
MULTI-HOUSING PROGRAM, supra note 62; LAS VEGAS CRIME FREE MULTI-HOUSING
PROGRAM, supra note 85, at 15. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design aims to deter crime in the parking lots or common areas of rental buildings. SAN DIEGO CRIME FREE
MULTI-HOUSING PROGRAM, supra note 62.
87 . See SAN DIEGO COUNTY CRIME FREE MULTI-HOUSING PROGRAM, supra note 62, at
13.
88 . Id .
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environmental design; (2) understanding crime prevention resident selection; (3) commonsense self-defense; (4) establishing community rules and
policies; (5) building apartment community; (6) good property management;
(7) partnerships with the sheriff’s department; (8) partnerships with the fire
department; (9) dealing with noncompliance; and (10) applying federal fair
housing laws. 89 Property managers must attend a training program every
other year to maintain the building’s certification. 90 Other topics that may be
covered in training and certification programs include the benefits of screening applicants for contacts with the criminal legal system and a discussion of
gangs, drugs, and related criminal activity. 91
Rental housing licensing programs often contain provisions requiring
fines and suspension or revocation of a license for failure to comply with
provisions of the crime-free ordinance. 92 For example, in Hesperia, California, the crime-free ordinance gives the Hesperia City Council broad discretion to create a fee structure for owners whose properties have consistent
violations of the crime-free policy. 93 In Minneapolis, Minnesota, the crimefree ordinance also allows for revocation of a rental license. 94 Notably, the
city may choose to stop any adverse licensing action where the landlord has
initiated eviction proceedings against tenants that the city or police department have identified as problematic. 95
2.

Background Checks and Crime-Free Databases

Many municipal crime-free ordinances either require or encourage
landlords to conduct criminal background checks before renting to a pro-

89 . Id .
90 . Id . at 14.
91 . Crime Free Multi-Housing, supra note 4.
92. WERTH, supra note 1, at 4; see, e .g ., CAROL STREAM, ILL., CODE § 10-12-4(F)(3)
(2016); DULUTH, MINN., CODE § 29A-41 (2008); FARIBAULT, MINN., CODE §§ 7-42(3)(d)-(g)
(2017); ST. LOUIS PARK, MINN., CODE § 8-334(b)(5) (2010); ORLAND PARK, ILL., CRIME FREE
HOUSING RENTAL REQUIREMENTS FOR OWNERS/AGENTS OF RENTAL HOUSING 2–3, https://
www.orland-park.il.us/DocumentCenter/Home/View/1768
[https://perma.cc/8XY2-43FB];
Frequently Asked Questions, HANOVER PARK POLICE DEP’T, https://www.hpil.org/
Faq.aspx?QID=68 [https://perma.cc/T3RR-AEM7] (“The owners who actively work with the
police department in an attempt to resolve the problem should have no concern. The Village
will not automatically suspend or revoke a rental license for a property that has residents or
guests, who engage in criminal activity, or that meets the nuisance standard.”).
93. HESPERIA, CAL., CODE §§ 8.20.80–8.20.090 (2017) (leaving open the possibility to
levy fines against landlords who fail CFTED inspections). Hesperia removed—after the threat
of litigation—provisions requiring mandatory evictions by police or landlords for tenants in
violation of the crime-free ordinance. Rene Ray De La Cruz, Hesperia Amends Crime Free
Housing Program, DAILY PRESS (July 28, 2017, 3:33 PM), https://www.vvdailypress.com/news/
20170728/hesperia-amends-crime-free-housing-program [https://perma.cc/P9E9-MNAF].
94. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE § 244.2020(f) (2014).
95. Id. § 244.2020(g).
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spective tenant. 96 Even where these checks are not mandated by the applicable ordinance, municipalities often encourage landlords to screen tenants
during their landlord training programs. 97 Simply encouraging background
checks can be enough to make them commonplace. 98 The CFMH model
landlord training manual 99 specifically informs landlords that “it is not illegal to deny residency to an application based on their criminal history.” 100
The manual further warns that once the applicant discloses their criminal
history, the landlord must make an immediate decision to accept or reject
the application of a prospective tenant: “If you accept the application, you
may lose the right to deny the applicant later for any information they have
disclosed.” 101
In some jurisdictions, landlords are encouraged to look beyond criminal
convictions when screening potential tenants. Hesperia, California, maintains a “Crime Free Screening Program” 102 that allows landlords to request
information on arrests involving a prospective or current adult tenant. 103 In
Minneapolis, the city has created an alert system that allows landlords to receive near-instant updates of any alleged criminal activity of a current tenant. 104 Finally, Orlando, Florida, allows crime-free certified properties to
have access to a criminal database that tracks everyone who has been arrest-

96. WERTH, supra note 1, at 15.
97 . Id .
98 . See Luther Krueger, “Crime-Free Multi-Housing” and Other Public Policy Means of
Mass Relocation 2, 4–5 (Oct. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Michigan Law
Review) (explaining the “sticks” and “carrots” landlords are presented with, which either pressure them or incentivize them to make use of the tools that cities with crime-free housing programs offer).
99. While the ICFA website does not include a model manual, the manuals provided by
San Diego County and the Las Vegas Police Department contain copyright statements attributing ownership to the International Crime Free Association, Inc. See SAN DIEGO COUNTY
CRIME FREE MULTI-HOUSING PROGRAM, supra note 62, at 3; LAS VEGAS CRIME FREE MULTIHOUSING PROGRAM, supra note 85, at 2. Moreover, they contain large sections that are identical copies of each other. This Article therefore refers to these pages as part of a model training
manual.
100. LAS VEGAS CRIME FREE MULTI-HOUSING PROGRAM, supra note 85, at 27. Compare
id . (“[Y]ou should not discriminate on the basis of an arrest; but only on a conviction.”), with
Crime Free Lease Addendum, INT’L CRIME FREE ASS’N, http://www.crime-free-association.org
/lease_addendums_az_english.htm [https://perma.cc/3B54-CC4R] (noting that violation of the
crime-free policy can be established without a conviction).
101. LAS VEGAS CRIME FREE MULTI-HOUSING PROGRAM, supra note 85, at 28. Interestingly, the ICFA-modeled training manuals suggest that a prospective tenant with a conviction
for felony embezzlement may pose less danger than someone with a misdemeanor assault
charge, highlighting an obvious class dimension to the screening process. Id . at 27 (“A felony
embezzlement charge may not be a threat, but a misdemeanor charge for assault may constitute a threat.”).
102. HESPERIA, CAL., CODE § 8.20.050(B) (2017).
103 . Id . §§ 8.20.050(A), (B)(1).
104 . See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE § 244.2020(c) (2014).
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ed within the city. 105 The database not only includes felony arrests of adult
tenants but also tracks all arrests for misdemeanors and juvenile felonies. 106
3.

Crime-Free Lease Addendum

According to the ICFA, the “heart and soul” of the Crime Free MultiHousing program is the rigorous implementation of the model Crime Free
Lease Addendum. 107 The program encourages municipalities to adopt ordinances that include a crime-free lease addendum, which allows for the eviction of tenants who are believed to have engaged in or facilitated criminal
behavior. 108
The sample addendum available on the ICFA website states, “[a] single
violation of any of the provisions of this added addendum shall be deemed a
serious violation, and a material and irreparable non-compliance. It is understood that a single violation shall be good cause for immediate termination
of the lease . . . .” 109 Under ICFA’s model, a tenant risks eviction if he or she
has engaged in or facilitated an act of criminal activity. The model addendum does not specifically define what constitutes criminal activity for purposes of the agreement. Other provisions prohibit certain types of illegal
activity as defined by state laws, such as prostitution, criminal street gang activity, assault, and dealings with controlled substances. 110
The ICFA model lease addendum does not explicitly state whether actionable criminal activity is limited to convictions. However, a common
crime-free lease addendum provision states, “[u]nless otherwise provided by
law, proof of violation shall not require a criminal conviction, but shall be by
a preponderance of the evidence.” 111 This leaves ambiguous which interactions with the criminal legal system are sufficient to rise to the level of “criminal activity” and raises the specter of discretion informed by bias. Moreover,
in the model CFMH training manual, the program encourages landlords to
establish relationships with police departments and to gather information

105. Bianca Prieto, Crime-Free Apartment Program Starting in Orlando, ORLANDO
SENTINEL (Jan. 30, 2011), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2011-01-30/news/os-orlandocrime-free-multihousing-20110130_1_crime-free-multi-housing-complexes-crime-free
[https://perma.cc/VF2G-WNZF].
106 . Crime Free Multi-Housing, CITY OF ORLANDO, http://www.cityoforlando.net/police/
crimefreemultihousing/ [https://perma.cc/MXG3-GJHW].
107 . Crime Free Multi-Housing, supra note 4.
108 . See Crime Free Lease Addendums: Keep Illegal Activity off Rental Property, INT’L
CRIME FREE ASS’N, http://www.crime-free-association.org/lease_addendums.htm [https://
perma.cc/4KFN-T3MC].
109 . Crime Free Lease Addendum, supra note 100 (emphases added).
110. SCHAUMBURG, ILL., CODE § 99.10.05(F)(7) (2019) (including an exhaustive list of
prohibited crimes such as homicide, prostitution, bodily harm, theft, disorderly conduct, gambling, and interference with public officers).
111 . See Crime Free Lease Addendum, supra note 100.
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even in cases where the officer makes no arrest or formal report. 112 Taken
with the violation provision above, the guidance in the manual opens the
possibility that a mere arrest—or even a stop that results in neither arrest nor
conviction—might suffice for termination of a lease. Consequently, these
provisions often provide inadequate notice to tenants regarding the types of
interactions with the criminal legal system that may establish a violation of
the crime-free lease addendum.
Furthermore, localities differ on whether criminal activity must be
committed on the premises to constitute a violation of the crime-free lease
addendum. The ICFA model lease addendum suggests that municipalities
and landlords adopt a policy that establishes a violation if the activity was
committed “on or near” the premises. 113 These policies create a “buffer zone”
extending the possibility of a lease violation beyond the premises. 114 Some
municipalities adopt even more restrictive policies. In Schaumburg, Illinois,
any alleged criminal activity committed within the city limits by the tenant, a
member of the tenant’s household, or even a guest is deemed a violation of
the crime-free lease addendum. 115 Like Schaumburg, most ordinances establish a violation of the lease addendum where the tenant, other member of the
household, or guest is alleged to be involved with criminal activity. 116
When a tenant violates the crime-free lease addendum, the ordinances
give the landlord the authority to evict tenants for these activities, including
those committed by guests or other members of the household. 117 Some go

112 . See SAN DIEGO COUNTY CRIME FREE MULTI-HOUSING PROGRAM, supra note 62, at
71–74 (recommending that landlords try to gather information from police officers engaging
at one of the owner’s rental units and that landlords request police surveillance of specific tenants).
113 . Crime Free Lease Addendum, supra note 100.
114 . See WERTH, supra note 1, at 17–18 (“[S]ome municipalities apply these ordinances
to the conduct . . . that occurs at a different location from the property where the tenant
lives. . . . [A]pplying these ordinances to criminal conduct that takes place off the property can
exacerbate fair housing problems.”).
115. SCHAUMBURG, ILL., CODE § 99.10.05(F)(3)–(4) (establishing liability whether or not
the guest is under the tenant’s control).
116 . See WERTH, supra note 1, at 3 (explaining that a crime free lease “is an agreement
that makes criminal (and sometimes other) activity by tenants, their household members, their
guests, and other specified third parties a violation of the lease that can be the basis for an eviction.”). For examples of city ordinances containing similar provisions, see HESPERIA, CAL.,
CODE § 8.20.050(C)(1)(a)(i) (2019) (requiring that the Crime Free Lease Addendum include a
provision stating that household members and guests shall not engage in criminal activity);
FARIBAULT, MINN., CODE § 7-43(10)(b) (2018) (“A tenant is responsible for compliance with
all applicable City Code, nuisance, and violations of disorderly conduct . . . including violations
committed by household members or guests.”); MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE § 244.2020(a)
(2013) (indicating that landowners must take appropriate action “following conduct by tenants
and/or their guests on the licensed premises which is determined to be disorderly”).
117. Marie Claire Tran-Leung, Beyond Fear and Myth: Using the Disparate Impact Theory Under the Fair Housing Act to Challenge Housing Barriers Against People with Criminal Records, 45 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 4, 5 (2011); see also SCHAUMBURG, ILL., CODE § 99.10.05(F)
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as far as encouraging eviction upon a single violation of the provision, 118
while others leave it to the “sole discretion” of the landlord to determine
what actions to take. 119
The following Section provides a more granular analysis of crime-free
housing ordinances, using Faribault, Minnesota—a mandatory program—
and Orlando, Florida—a voluntary program—as case studies.
C. Specific Crime-Free Housing Ordinances Examined
1.

Faribault, Minnesota

The Faribault, Minnesota crime-free ordinance went into effect in 2015
with goals that move far beyond crime reduction. The ordinance seeks to assure “that rental housing in the City of Faribault is decent, safe, and sanitary
and is so operated and maintained not to become a nuisance to the neighborhood or to become an influence that fosters blight and deterioration or
creates a disincentive to reinvestment in the community.” 120 The Faribault
ordinance is among the harshest in the country. 121 First, the ordinance creates a requirement that all owners of rental housing obtain a license from the
city to operate a rental dwelling and lays out a series of requirements for obtaining and retaining that license, including compliance with the crime-free
housing provisions of the ordinance. 122 The ordinance also provides a number of reasons that a license can be revoked or not renewed. Among the reasons are “[f]ailure to actively pursue the eviction of a tenant or otherwise
terminate the lease with a tenant who has violated the provisions of this Article or Crime Free Drug Lease Addendum or has otherwise created a public
nuisance.” 123
The ordinance also requires all licensees to conduct criminal background checks, going back at least three years, on all prospective tenants or
occupants who are eighteen years or older. 124 The landlord must retain the
results of the criminal background check for at least one year after the check,
even if the prospective tenant is rejected, and for a year after the tenancy

(mandating a crime-lease provision in every residential lease and stating that violations of the
provision furnish grounds for eviction).
118 . See, e .g ., SCHAUMBURG, ILL., CODE § 99.10.05(F)(5) (“One or more violations . . . of
this Lease Section constitute a substantial violation and a material noncompliance with the
Lease. Any such violation is grounds for termination of tenancy and eviction from the leased
premises.”).
119 . See, e .g ., HESPERIA, CAL., CODE § 8.20.050(C)(2)(c).
120. FARIBAULT, MINN., CODE § 7-36.
121. Litigation has been filed to challenge the Faribault ordinance under the Fair Housing Act, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Minnesota Constitution. Jones v. City of Faribault, No. 18-cv-01643 (D. Minn. filed June 13, 2018).
122. FARIBAULT, MINN., CODE § 7-38(1).
123 . Id . § 7-42(3)(g).
124 . Id . § 7-44(4).
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ends. 125 The ordinance does not, however, provide any guidance on what criteria should be used in assessing and reviewing the criminal background
check. The Faribault Police Department does provide guidance and encourages landlords to look beyond criminal convictions during background
checks and to consider arrests and even police contact. A Faribault police officer who runs the crime-free program on behalf of the Faribault Police Department said:
In our crime-free classes that property owners and managers are required
to attend, I explain that, sometimes during the criminal history checks, you
can find out more information by coming to the PD and asking for public
data that would show police contacts . . . . There may not be a conviction,
but there is a wealth of information. 126

Faribault’s ordinance also provides the text of a crime-free lease provision that is mandatory for every new or renewed lease. 127 The text of the
mandatory lease provision prohibits a “[r]esident, any members of the resident’s household or a guest or other person under the resident’s control”
from engaging in “illegal activity, including drug-related illegal activity” on
or near the premises, as well as acts “intended to facilitate illegal activity” on
or near the premises. 128 Finally, it prohibits members of the household from
engaging in the manufacture, sale, or distribution of illegal drugs anywhere. 129 A single violation of the crime-free lease addendum “shall be
deemed a serious violation and material non-compliance with the lease.” 130
Importantly, the ordinance does not define what constitutes illegal activity—
making any violation of the law grounds for eviction after a single violation.
The ordinance also prohibits disorderly conduct on all licensed premises
and makes it the responsibility of the landlord to prevent disorderly conduct
by tenants and their guests, including through eviction. 131 The ordinance
specifically provides that to find that disorderly conduct occurred, “[i]t shall
not be necessary that criminal charges be brought in order to support such
finding, nor shall the dismissal or acquittal of such a criminal charge operate
as a bar to any action under this Section.” 132
Finally, the ordinance gives the Faribault police the power to order eviction of a tenant pursuant to the lease addendum without an arrest or conviction. If the police department determines that a premises or dwelling unit
125 . Id . § 7-44(4)(d).
126. Gunnar Olson, Mixed Emotions: Landlords, Officials Measure Success Differently for
Crime-Free Multi-Housing Program, FARIBAULT DAILY NEWS (Mar. 29, 2017), http://
www.southernminn.com/faribault_daily_news/news/article_c76a6322-04d9-52c8-bab3c3d0ce77a299.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
127. FARIBAULT, MINN., CODE § 7-44(3).
128 . Id . § 7-44(3)(a)–(b).
129 . Id . § 7-44(3)(d).
130 . Id . § 7-44(3)(e) (emphasis omitted).
131 . Id . § 7-43(1)–(2).
132 . Id . § 7-43(5).
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was used in violation of the crime-free provisions, or that a tenant or occupant is in violation of the provision, the licensee must terminate the tenancy
of all tenants occupying the unit and may not enter into a new lease with any
of them for a period of one year. 133
2.

Orlando, Florida

In 2009, Orlando, Florida, adopted a voluntary Crime Free MultiHousing Program. 134 An Orlando police officer described the program as designed to “squeez[e] out all of the people who just don’t want to do right, so
good people can have a nice, quiet place to live.” 135 The program has three
components. First, property owners and managers who want to participate
in the program can attend an eight-hour seminar presented by the police department. 136 “During this training class, managers and property owners will
learn about the crime prevention theory, lease agreements and eviction issues . . . [and] on-going security management.” 137 The second component of
the program is called “Crime Prevention Through Environment Design.” 138
Here, the Orlando Police Department assesses the property to confirm that it
meets the security requirements of the program. 139 The final component,
and the centerpiece of the program, allows a property to advertise that it has
“Full Certification” if the property management agrees to include a crimefree lease addendum, modeled on the ICFA model lease addendum, in all of
its leases to help with the removal of “problem tenants.” 140 The Orlando lease
addendum provides that once a property owner or manager is notified that a
tenant has been arrested, he or she “can fill out an eviction form and give the
[accused] resident seven days to move out.” 141 “A resident does not have to
be convicted to get evicted.” 142 In one example, an Orlando resident was
caught smoking marijuana and was evicted from his apartment within the
week for violating the crime-free lease addendum. 143
By becoming fully certified, Orlando properties have access to the Orlando GOAL Database, which provides data about “police actions” involving

133 . Id . § 7–44(5)(a).
134 . 9 Investigates: Crime Free Multi-Housing Program Proves Successful, WFTV (Mar.
21, 2014, 5:42 PM), https://www.wftv.com/news/local/9-investigates-successful-crime-freemulti-housing_nfjgn/106830752 [https://perma.cc/U9E2-NEE2].
135. Prieto, supra note 105.
136 . Crime Free Multi-Housing, supra note 106.
137 . Id .
138 . Id .
139 . Id .
140 . Id .
141 . 9 Investigates, supra note 134.
142 . Id .
143 . Id .
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their tenants and others in their community. 144 Specifically, the database lists
“all persons arrested on Crime Free Certified Properties, as well as other
properties in the Database.” 145 All adult misdemeanor and felony arrests, as
well as juvenile felony arrests, are entered into the database. 146 Certified
properties also have access to a “Tenant Criminal Violation/Eviction List”
that identifies all renters who have been evicted pursuant to the Crime Free
Multi-Housing Program. 147 The purpose of this list, according to the City of
Orlando, is to “track[] the criminal violators so they cannot migrate from
community to community.” 148 The top of the list states, “[t]he person(s)
named on this list have been involved in Police-documented criminal activity and/or evicted because of Police-documented criminal activity. Involvement in any criminal activity while a resident of a Crime Free Multi-Housing
Community is a violation of the Crime Free Multi-Housing Standards and is
subsequently grounds for eviction.” 149 The list is automatically sent to property managers every week. 150
Between 2009 and 2014, approximately 1,400 renters were evicted under
the program. 151 One of those people was Leroy Ebanks. When he was twenty-one years old, police suspected that Mr. Ebanks participated in breaking
into a car. 152 Police questioned him and he denied any involvement. 153 In
connection with his questioning, the police checked Mr. Ebanks’s criminal
history, which showed that he had two prior arrests but no convictions. 154
The officers turned that information over to the rental complex where Mr.
Ebanks lived, and the building management immediately started eviction
proceedings. 155
III. OVERVIEW OF NORMATIVE CONCERNS
While seeking to maintain the safety of rental properties is a laudable
goal, the widespread adoption of tenant-screening and eviction practices
based on contacts with the criminal legal system raises a host of public policy

144 . Crime Free Multi-Housing, supra note 106.
145 . Id .
146 . Id .
147 . 9 Investigates, supra note 134.
148 . Crime Free Multi-Housing, supra note 106.
149 . 9 Investigates, supra note 134.
150 . Crime Free Multi-Housing, ORANGE COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFF., https://www.ocso.com
/Crime-Information/Crime-Prevention/Crime-Free-Multi-Housing [https://perma.cc/PYN9YKHQ] (“Property managers will be sent an automatic weekly report which will provide notification of arrests for criminal incidents occurring on your property as well as the arrests of
tenants.”).
151 . 9 Investigates, supra note 134.
152. Prieto, supra note 105.
153 . Id .
154 . Id .
155 . Id .
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and civil rights concerns. Although a full exploration of these issues is beyond the scope of this Article, there are concerns, beyond the segregative
impact, that warrant mention here. Those concerns include evidence of intentional racial discrimination, promotion of destructive narratives around
people with criminal legal system contacts, and importation of harmful and
discredited policing practices into the private housing market.
A. Adoption in Response to Increasing Racial Diversity in the Community
Crime-free housing ordinances are often adopted following burgeoning
racial diversity, not burgeoning crime. Indeed, there is evidence surrounding
the adoption of some of these ordinances that racial segregation may be
more than an unfortunate by-product. Faribault, Minnesota, is an instructive
example. The Faribault crime-free ordinance was passed in 2014 with a goal
of getting rid of “problem tenants” living in downtown Faribault. 156 There is
reason to believe that the language of “problem tenants” operated as a “dog
whistle.” 157 Nearly all of the racial and ethnic minority households in downtown Faribault live in rental housing. 158
The Black population of Faribault, composed almost entirely of Somali
immigrants and refugees, nearly tripled between 2000 and 2010. 159 The 2010
census showed an increase of 214% in Faribault’s Black population since
2000 and a 263% increase in the Black population living in the downtown
area of Faribault during the same period. 160 The overall number of Black
households increased 542% in that decade. 161 Although residents of Faribault
began complaining about increases in crime during this period, the overall
crime rates in Faribault did not, in fact, increase dramatically. 162
In 2013, resident complaints of increased drug activity and theft in
downtown Faribault had become a hot button issue, but police reported that
records did not support any claims of an increase. 163 The police chief report156 . See Complaint at 45, Jones v. City of Faribault, No. 18-cv-01643 (D. Minn. June 13,
2018); Memorandum from Andy Bohlen, Faribault Police Chief, to Brian J. Anderson, Faribault City Adm’r, Information on Central Avenue Concerns (Oct. 10, 2013) (on file with author).
157 . See generally IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL
APPEALS HAVE REINVENTED RACISM AND WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS (2014).
158. RICE COUNTY HOUSING STUDY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE HOUSING NEEDS OF THE
CITIES IN RICE COUNTY, at DF-12 (2012), http://www.faribault.org/DocumentCenter/View
/579/2011-Rice-County-Housing-Study--Countywide-PDF [https://perma.cc/LJ37-TWLJ].
159 . Id . at F-119.
160 . Id . at F-119, DF-6.
161 . Id . at F-22.
162. Complaint, supra note 156, at 7–9, (stating that crime rates generally decreased between 2000 and 2014).
163. Rebecca Rodenborg, Faribault Police, Business Owners Take a Look at Downtown
Crime, FARIBAULT DAILY NEWS (Mar. 2, 2013), http://www.southernminn.com/faribault_
daily_news/news/article_4c1c5b25-7c58-5053-8de5-c60caac77469.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
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ed that he believed the issues were largely a result of cultural differences in
the way Somali residents of Faribault used public space and noted that the
police department would seek to decrease pedestrian traffic in the target areas. 164
The decision to exempt certain properties from the Faribault crime-free
ordinance also demonstrates an intent to focus on the growing Black population while lessening the impact on the White residents of Faribault. In Faribault, the ordinance exempts single-family dwellings occupied by a relative
of the owner. 165 This provision is more likely to exempt White residents,
who are more likely to own their own home than to live in rental property. 166
This exemption allows White property owners to rent to their presumably
White relatives without concern for those relatives’ history with the criminal
legal system. Similar exemptions are included in crime-free ordinances
around the country. 167
Finally, signs of intent are also evident in some of the statements local
officials made when discussing and adopting crime-free ordinances. Local
officials have proudly proclaimed their intent to “move the bad guys out of
town,” or to keep out undesirables, or the criminal element. 168 These statements are often coded expressions of racial animus. Indeed, in housing discrimination cases, courts have found similar statements to be “ ‘camouflaged’
racial expressions.” 169

164. Memorandum from Andy Bohlen, supra note 156; see also Complaint, supra note
156, at 7–13, (describing the racial animus that fueled the Faribault housing ordinance and
other similar proposals intended to silence and control the Somali population).
165. FARIBAULT, MINN., CODE § 7-38(1)(a)(1) (2018).
166. RICE COUNTY HOUSING STUDY, supra note 158, at F-23.
167 . See, e .g ., CAROL STREAM, ILL., CODE § 10-12-4(B)(1) (2014) (exempting landlords of
the residential rental license requirement for single-family dwellings occupied “by a member of
the owner’s immediate family”); ST. LOUIS PARK, MINN., CODE § 8-328 (2007) (exempting
owners from having to attend a training program if their “only rental housing is either unoccupied or a dwelling unit homestead by a relative”).
168. Katie Dahlstrom, DeKalb’s Crime Free Housing Program Gets Mixed Reviews, DAILY
CHRON. (Feb. 27, 2014), https://www.daily-chronicle.com/2014/02/26/dekalbs-crime-freehousing-program-gets-mixed-reviews/ajjphlv [https://perma.cc/P2YL-55JE]; see also Rodenborg, supra note 163.
169 . See Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1066 (4th Cir. 1982) (finding reference to “an influx of ‘undesirables’ ” and concerns about “personal safety due to the influx of
‘new’ people” to be coded racial expressions); see also Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. County of Nassau,
819 F.3d 581, 610 (2d Cir. 2016) (acknowledging racially coded nature of statement, “keep
Garden City what it is”); Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. St. Bernard Par., 648 F.
Supp. 2d 805, 811–12 (E.D. La. 2009) (analogizing concerns about the “criminal element” or
protecting “similar values” and references to concerns about “ ‘crime,’ ‘blight,’ and ‘quality of
life’ . . . to the types of expressions that courts in similar situations have found to be nothing
more than ‘camouflaged racial expressions.’ ” (quoting Smith, 682 F.2d at 1066)); Atkins v.
Robinson, 545 F. Supp. 852, 874 (E.D. Va. 1982) (finding statement that someone “feared the
projects ‘would degenerate to slum-like conditions, with an abundance of crime’ ” to be a
“veiled reference to race”); cf . Doe v. Village of Mamaroneck, 462 F. Supp. 2d 520, 530, 540
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B. The Promotion of Destructive Messages Concerning People with Criminal
Legal System Contacts
The narratives about formerly incarcerated people that are often embedded in the structure of crime-free ordinances and promoted through
training and descriptive materials can deepen the social stigma experienced
by formerly incarcerated people returning home and contribute to the cycle
of recidivism. In the past several years, correctional facilities have released
“record numbers” of formerly incarcerated people who then sought to successfully reenter their communities. 170 However, several structural barriers
hinder their efforts, including “bars to obtaining government benefits, voting
disenfranchisement, disqualification from educational grants, exclusion
from certain business and professional licenses, and exclusion from public
housing.” 171 This list of collateral consequences 172 is compounded by social
stigma and stereotyping that feed private discrimination and limit the ability
of formerly incarcerated people to make connections with their community
and build supportive networks. The messages crime-free ordinances convey
about formerly incarcerated people perpetuate this social stigma and stereotyping.
Formerly incarcerated people return to a society that is hostile to their
inclusion. Generally, they “are assumed to be dangerous, aggressive, and
unworthy of trust, and upon release are met with suspicion and hostility.” 173
This social stigma and stereotyping can affect every aspect of formerly incarcerated individuals’ lives, including their capacity to build positive social
connections. 174 The social exclusion can complicate their participation in the
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding “quality of life” concern pretext for racial animus in harassment of
day laborers).
170. Michael Pinard, A Reentry-Centered Vision of Criminal Justice, 20 FED. SENT’G REP.
103, 103 (2007).
171. Anthony C. Thompson, Navigating the Hidden Obstacles to Ex-Offender Reentry, 45
B.C. L. REV. 255, 258 (2004); see also CLEAR, supra note 10, at 58 (discussing some of the employment restrictions that have been placed on individuals who were formerly incarcerated);
Jamil A. Favors, Deconstructing Re-entry: Identifying Issues, Best Practices and Solutions, 21 U.
PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 53, 61–64 (2018) (discussing some of the difficulties faced by individuals reentering their communities). See generally Deborah N. Archer & Kele S. Williams, Making America “The Land of Second Chances”: Restoring Socioeconomic Rights for Ex-Offenders, 30
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 527 (2006) (discussing barriers to reentry).
172. Collateral consequences, the indirect consequences that flow from a criminal conviction, include a “range of social and civil restrictions” and can have an astonishing impact on
recidivism rates. See Michael Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, Offender Reentry and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: An Introduction, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 585, 590 (2006).
173. Adrienne Lyles-Chockley, Transitions to Justice: Prisoner Reentry as an Opportunity
to Confront and Counteract Racism, 6 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 259, 269 (2009) (discussing the stigma associated with having been incarcerated).
174 . See CLEAR, supra note 10, at 8–9 (discussing how the criminalization of Black men
has harmed that group’s social image and the practical, negative effects this has on employment prospects); JEREMY TRAVIS ET AL., URBAN INST., FROM PRISON TO HOME: THE
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life of their communities and consign them “to the margins of legitimate society.” 175 In the end, the social stigma and marginalization play into the cycle
of recidivism. 176
Moreover, the stigma surrounding formerly incarcerated people is often
intertwined with racial stereotypes. Unfortunately, “for many Americans,
crime has a [B]lack” or Brown face. 177 Thus, formerly incarcerated Black
people generally fight against “double stigma” related to their status and historical narratives of Black people as dangerous and violent. 178 Indeed, the
narrative of Black dangerousness and excessive criminality remains a relentless part of our cultural view, seeping into debates about race on topics from
criminal justice reform to parenting, education, and housing. 179
San Diego County presents an example of the dangerous messages conveyed through crime-free programs. In San Diego, the intended message is
clear: “When you think of criminals, think of predators.” 180 San Diego County’s program analogizes individuals with criminal legal system involvement
to weeds, stating that as the weed grows “it roots, sprouts, and chokes out
healthy plants. A single weed quickly overtakes an entire garden. When
criminal activity is allowed to flourish, the effect is the same.” 181 This imagery shapes the lens through which society views people with criminal legal
system contacts. It says that people who have committed a crime are a cancer, unable to change, and undeserving of compassion or consideration.
People are encouraged to act through fear; there is no room for second
chances.

DIMENSIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF PRISONER REENTRY (2001), http://research.urban.org
/UploadedPDF/from_prison_to_home.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5BJ-98GC] (“[T]he stigma attached to incarceration makes it difficult for ex-prisoners to be hired.”).
175. Pinard & Thompson, supra note 172, at 590; see also Eumi K. Lee, The Centerpiece to
Real Reform? Political, Legal, and Social Barriers to Reentry in California, 7 HASTINGS RACE &
POVERTY L.J. 243, 251–56 (2010) (arguing that the barriers to reentry contribute to the high
rates of recidivism); Thompson, supra note 171, at 273 (arguing that social isolation faced by
people with criminal convictions “effectively relegate[s] ex-offenders to the margins of legitimate society, stigmatizing them and further highlighting their separation from law-abiding
members of society”).
176. Lyles-Chockley, supra note 173, at 271.
177. Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians,
and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 787 (1994).
178. CLEAR, supra note 10, at 8–9 (“The social concept of the ‘dangerous young black
man,’ so deeply ingrained in our nation’s consciousness, continues to fuel punitive politics.”
(citations omitted)); Lyles-Chockley, supra note 173, at 269.
179 . See Brief for the National Black Law Students Ass’n, supra note 26, at 5–16 (explaining the history of the view that Black people are uniquely violent and dangerous). See generally
Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937 (2003) (presenting research
that suggests that prospective employers treat Black applicants as if they have a criminal record, regardless of whether they disclose one or not).
180. SAN DIEGO COUNTY CRIME FREE MULTI-HOUSING PROGRAM, supra note 62, at 2.
181 . Id . at 1.
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The stigma born of this narrative is particularly harmful because of its
impact on housing options for formerly incarcerated people. Housing is critically important for successful reentry and can present a significant challenge
for individuals returning from incarceration. 182 Many rental property owners
state that they would not knowingly rent their property to someone with a
criminal conviction and often deny rental applications based on the fact that
an individual has a criminal record. 183 This is also a problem embedded in
the structure of these programs and ordinances. Most crime-free programs
require or encourage landlords to conduct criminal background checks for
all rental applicants. The screenings established by these ordinances and advocated by the trainings have the effect of sending the message “that all tenants with criminal histories are more likely to bring criminal activity” with
them. 184
C. Importing Harmful Policing Practices into the Private Housing Market
Crime-free housing ordinances provide the criminal legal system with a
broader province of impact and influence. 185 The ICFA has advertised that
crime-free ordinances are driven by law enforcement and based on principles of policing. 186 Race plays an undeniable role in policing in the United
States. In using principles of policing in both design and implementation,
crime-free ordinances import racially discriminatory policing practices into
the private housing market.
182. TRAVIS ET AL., supra note 174, at 35 (discussing the barriers people released from
prison face in finding housing); Lyles-Chockley, supra note 173, at 282 (“The denial of crucial
social benefits—including food stamps and federally subsidized housing—is a final, and sometimes devastating, blow to ex-offenders attempting to successfully integrate into their communities.”); Thompson, supra note 171, at 278–79 (discussing how housing has been a barrier to
reentry); see Archer & Williams, supra note 171, at 543; Pinard & Thompson, supra note 172,
at 595.
183. TRAVIS ET AL., supra note 174, at 35 (“Landlords typically require potential tenants
to list employment and housing references and to disclose financial and criminal history information. For these reasons, offenders are often excluded from the private housing market.”);
Thompson, supra note 171, at 278 (“Private property owners often inquire into the individual’s
background and tend to deny housing to anyone with a criminal record . . . .”).
184. Tran-Leung, supra note 117, at 5; see also WERTH, supra note 1, at 15 (“[L]andlords
that are encouraged or required to screen prospective tenants are likely to err on the side of
rejecting anyone with a record.”); cf . LAS VEGAS CRIME FREE MULTI-HOUSING PROGRAM, supra note 85, at 27 (emphasizing that it is not illegal to deny residency based on criminal history
and recommending that landlords looking over applicants’ criminal histories ask themselves if
the crimes committed are those that “pose[] a threat to [the landlord’s] residents”). Recall,
however, that the ICFA model training manual suggests that a prospective tenant with a conviction for felony embezzlement may pose less danger than someone with a misdemeanor assault charge, highlighting an obvious race and class dimension to screening. Supra note 101.
185 . See Swan, supra note 27, at 833 (discussing the way that civil ordinances are used in
the service of crime control).
186 . See Crime Free Multi-Housing, supra note 4 (“The Crime Free Programs are innovative, law enforcement based crime prevention solutions designed to help keep illegal activity off
rental property.”).
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Race has always played a critical role in policing. Racism is a defining
feature of American society, a feature that is urgently felt throughout the
criminal legal system. As Ta-Nehisi Coates writes, when reflecting on his
friend’s killing at the hands of police officers:
I knew that Prince was not killed by a single officer so much as he was
murdered by his country and all the fears that have marked it from birth.
At this moment the phrase “police reform” has come into vogue, and
the actions of our publicly appointed guardians have attracted attention
presidential and pedestrian. You may have heard the talk of diversity, sensitivity training, and body cameras. These are all fine and applicable, but they
understate the task and allow the citizens of this country to pretend that
there is real distance between their own attitudes and those of the ones appointed to protect them. The truth is that the police reflect America in all of
its will and fear, and whatever we might make of this country’s criminal
justice policy, it cannot be said that it was imposed by a repressive minority. The abuses that have followed from these policies—the sprawling carceral state, the random detention of Black people, the torture of suspects—
are the product of democratic will. 187

Policing is not immune to the racism that plagues the rest of society. Indeed,
this country has a general problem of racialized policing—racialized encounters, stops, frisks, arrests, and violence. 188 Under the reign of contemporary
policing, people of color, particularly Black and Latino men, are stigmatized,
brutalized, and burdened with fines and arrest records at an alarming rate.
Under contemporary policing models, officers too frequently rely on racial
stereotypes of people of color that make them presumptively people of interest to the police. 189
By linking an individual’s encounters with police officers to the possibility of being denied access to private housing, crime-free ordinances add a
new dimension to the sad history of race shaping access to housing. Crime-

187. TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME 78–79 (2015).
188 . See I. Bennett Capers, Race, Policing, and Technology, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1241, 1255–56
(2017) (providing evidence of racial profiling in New York City, Los Angeles, Philadelphia,
Minnesota, Maryland, Boston, North Carolina, New Jersey, and other American cities); John J.
Donohue III & Steven D. Levitt, The Impact of Race on Policing and Arrests, 44 J.L. & ECON.
367, 367 (2001) (finding that an increase in “white police increase[s] the number of arrests of
nonwhites but do[es] not systematically affect the number of white arrests”); Bennett L.
Gershman, Use of Race in “Stop-and-Frisk”: Stereotypical Beliefs Linger, but How Far Can the
Police Go?, N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J., MAR.–APR. 2000, at 42, 42 (explaining that a study done by the
New York state attorney general’s office found that Blacks were over six times more likely to be
stopped than Whites, and Hispanics more than four times as likely).
189 . See Capers, supra note 188, at 1254–55 (discussing the problems with and evidence
of racial profiling); Devon W. Carbado & Patrick Rock, What Exposes African Americans to
Police Violence?, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 163 (2016) (explaining the variables that
“converge to render African Americans vulnerable to repeated police interactions”); Kevin R.
Johnson, Race Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 28 HUM. RTS., Winter 2001, at 23, 23
(discussing how the Supreme Court “opened the door to Border Patrol reliance on race” in
conducting immigration stops).
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free ordinances allow the racial bias, both explicit and implicit, that has woven itself into the fabric of American policing to more easily weave itself
throughout the private housing market.
Conversely, these ordinances can also affect policing by leading to increased contact between people of color and police officers through aggressive, zero-tolerance police responses to these ordinances. Crime-free
ordinances share several hallmarks with one of the most well-known models
of zero-tolerance policing: broken windows. The broken windows model of
policing focuses on the importance of disorder in generating and sustaining
more serious crime. 190 Broken windows theory does not argue that disorder
is directly linked to serious crime; instead, it posits that disorder leads to increased fear and withdrawal from residents, which then allows more serious
crime to move in because of decreased levels of informal social control. 191 In
translating this theory to policing policy and practice, the belief is that police
officers can disrupt this cycle by focusing on disorder, reducing fear and resident withdrawal, and promoting informal social control. The reality of broken windows policing is “aggressive enforcement of quality-of-life crimes . . .
as a way to suppress more serious crimes.” 192 Crime-free ordinances operate
in a similar vein. The ordinances focus on preempting criminal activity by
engaging the police and community to exclude people believed to bring
criminal activity—no matter how minor.
Around the country, broken windows policing has led to the criminalization and over-policing of individuals and communities of color. Crimefree ordinances have the potential to do the same. Zero-tolerance policing
has imposed an enormous cost on communities of color. 193 Poor people of
color have been the primary targets of zero-tolerance policing and “disproportionately exposed to the police.” 194 This is due, in part, to the implicit as-

190. George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/
broken-windows/304465/ [https://perma.cc/9SC3-KUXP].
191 . Id .
192. Jeffrey Fagan et al., Stops and Stares: Street Stops, Surveillance, and Race in the New
Policing, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 539, 542 (2016) (identifying broken windows policing as one
of the policing tools used to “disrupt criminal activities”); see also Carbado & Rock, supra note
189, at 163 (stating that Black communities are targeted by proactive policing practices because
of the stereotype that Black people are “criminally inclined”).
193. K. Babe Howell, The Costs of “Broken Windows” Policing: Twenty Years and Counting, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1059, 1061 (2016) (noting that Eric Garner was arrested for selling
loose cigarettes by a unit that was designated to address quality-of-life conditions as part of
broken windows policing).
194. Carbado & Rock, supra note 189, at 167; see also Fagan et al., supra note 192, at 544
(“The metrics of the ‘new policing’ pointed to the neighborhoods with the highest crime rates
as the targets of police activity. These usually were the places with concentrated poverty and
often were minority neighborhoods.”); Howell, supra note 193, at 1060 (“[W]hat zerotolerance policing does is make public spaces very, very dangerous for black people, Latino
people, poor people, LGBTQ people, people with substance abuse problems, people with mental health problems, and homeless people.”).
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sociation of people of color, particularly Black people, with criminality. 195
The result is increased scrutiny and police interactions. 196 While the theory
may aim to make public spaces safe, in actuality zero-tolerance policing has
made public spaces hazardous for people of color by criminalizing conduct
that is not a threat to public safety and is routinely ignored in affluent or
White communities, such as loitering, jaywalking, or playing loud music. 197
In the end, “[t]he risk of being subjected to a stop, summons, or arrest for de
minimis offenses means that many individuals, and particularly young men
of color, in aggressively policed neighborhoods experience a certain amount
of fear each time they leave their homes.” 198
Crime-free ordinances may increase the risk of police–citizen interactions, leading people of color to fear everyday interactions. They may also
increase the possibility that stigma, the state of being “a disfavored or dishonored individual in the eyes of society,” 199 will burden their lives in that
community. For people of color, everyday interactions are often a source of
racial indignity—they are denied the right to be ordinary, “unencumbered by
racial stigma and by the status of subordination.” 200 In explaining the im-

195. CLEAR, supra note 10, at 8–9 (“The increasing criminalization of black men has
meant that, as a group, black men are stigmatized.”). See generally Capers, supra note 188, at
1255–56 (laying out the disproportionate rates at which Black people are stopped by the police).
196. Lyles-Chockley, supra note 173, at 269–70.
197 . See Carbado & Rock, supra note 189, at 163 (explaining that, because of racial segregation, Black communities are often concentrated in “high crime areas” that are targeted
through proactive policing campaigns); Howell, supra note 193, at 1059 (describing the broken
windows policy implemented in New York City under Rudolph Giuliani as one that consisted
of zero-tolerance policing but mostly only as applied to “communities of color and vulnerable
populations”); see also AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND
WHITE 4, 91-97 (2013), https://www.aclu.org/report/report-war-marijuana-black-and-white
[https://perma.cc/HUZ8-BX7Y] (reporting on the disproportionate rates at which people of
color are stopped and prosecuted when compared to White people who are, statistically speaking, equally or more likely to commit similar offenses).
198. Howell, supra note 193, at 1060.
199. R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 809 (2004); see also Elise C. Boddie, Ordinariness as Equality, 93 IND. L.J.
57, 60 (2018) (“When stigma is internalized it corrupts one’s sense of self. . . . Thus, racially
stigmatized persons are not only externally diminished by social judgments but also become
agents of their own debasement.”).
200. Boddie, supra note 199, at 57; see also Aris Folley, Woman Reportedly Arrested After
Harassing Two Women for Speaking Spanish, HILL (Oct. 4, 2018, 10:17 AM),
https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/409865-white-woman-arrested-afterharassing-two-women-for-speaking [https://perma.cc/R99Q-9S2P]; Jessica Guynn, BBQ Becky,
Permit Patty and Why the Internet Is Shaming White People Who Police People ‘Simply for Being Black,’ USA TODAY (July 18, 2018, 6:30 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech
/2018/07/18/bbq-becky-permit-patty-and-why-internet-shaming-white-people-who-policeblack-people/793574002/ [https://perma.cc/WEY8-HAVU]; Alanne Orjoux et al., Attorney in
Rant That Went Viral Says He’s Not a Racist and Offers an Apology, CNN (May 22, 2018, 7:11
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/22/us/aaron-schlossberg-attorney-racist-rant-apology
/index.html [https://perma.cc/S6U4-RCZZ].
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portance of “ordinariness” in achieving equality, Elise Boddie examines the
story of Philando Castile, a Black man who was shot and killed in his car by a
police officer in St. Paul, Minnesota, during a traffic stop. Mr. Castile had
been stopped by the police more than forty-six times before that day, with
only six of the forty-six stops for offenses an officer could have observed before pulling him over. 201 In describing the way these forty-six stops may have
eroded Mr. Castile’s dignity and the burden of stigma, Boddie asks:
Did the possibility of being pulled over occupy his thoughts as he was driving? Did he plan how he would respond—what he would say and how he
would act if the police stopped him again? Did he ever feel demeaned or
humiliated by the police in prior stops? And, if so, did the sight of a police
car make him anxious or fearful? 202

Crime-free housing ordinances will intensify scrutiny and increase adverse
police interactions, turning everyday interactions into sources of anxiety,
trauma, and indignity.
IV. THE RACIALLY EXCLUSIONARY REALITY OF CRIME-FREE ORDINANCES
Crime-free ordinances will disproportionately affect Black people. However, the racial impact of crime-free housing ordinances will reach far beyond the individual resident. Government housing policy is never neutral in
its impact on racial segregation; the policy will either exacerbate segregation
or help to reverse it. 203 Eviction or rejection of a housing application based
on almost any type of criminal legal system exposure will further systemic
racial exclusion because of the racial disparities in who has a criminal record. 204 The impact is heightened because of the breadth of crime-free ordinances. The exclusions are not only based on convictions but, by design and
implementation, on any contact with the criminal legal system—from claims
that a person is suspicious, to stops, to arrests, to convictions. 205 The exclu201. Eyder Peralta & Cheryl Corley, The Driving Life and Death of Philando Castile, NPR
(July 15, 2016, 4:51 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/07/15/485835272/
the-driving-life-and-death-of-philando-castile [https://perma.cc/B5WP-4U8X].
202. Boddie, supra note 199, at 60.
203. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 9, at 190.
204 . See Valerie Schneider, The Prison to Homelessness Pipeline: Criminal Record Checks,
Race, and Disparate Impact, 93 IND. L.J. 421, 423–24 (2018) (noting that Black and Latinx people are incarcerated at disproportionate rates when compared to White people).
205. The Cedar Rapids ordinance encouraged evictions without need of a demonstrated
criminal conviction. Landlords Sue City over ‘Crime-Free’ Ordinance, AM. APARTMENT
OWNERS ASS’N, https://www.american-apartment-owners-association.org/property-manage
ment/latest-news/landlords-sue-city-over-crime-free-ordinance/
[https://perma.cc/9L2BZUNN]. The Faribault, Minnesota crime-free ordinance likewise explicitly says that “[i]t shall
not be necessary that criminal charges be brought in order to support such finding [of disorderly conduct], nor shall the dismissal or acquittal of such a criminal charge operate as a bar to
any action under this Section.” FARIBAULT, MINN., CODE § 7-43(5) (2017). In fact, landowners
in Faribault are encouraged to consider arrests and general contact with police when conducting background checks. Olson, supra note 126. Finally, evictions documented in Orlando
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sions not only apply when an individual is seeking to move into the community, but will force the evictions of individuals already living there and deter
others from applying for housing in that community in the first place. This
Part explores the racially exclusionary potential of crime-free ordinances.
Through crime-free ordinances, the criminal legal system becomes wrapped
around the entire housing process, forcing individuals with criminal legal
system contacts—disproportionately Black people—to find housing outside
of the communities in which they would otherwise live.
A. Racially Discriminatory Impact in the Adopting Municipality
Decisionmaking based on whether a person has involvement with the
criminal legal system effectively functions as a racialized criterion. This is
because there are racial disparities at every stage of the criminal process. 206
By relying on criteria destined to exclude people of color at disproportionate
rates, the ordinances will perpetuate and increase segregation in the communities that adopt them. 207 And, just as bastions of affluence in certain
communities concentrate disadvantage elsewhere, 208 concentrating Whiteness in a community will make other communities more segregated. Accordingly, the ordinances will predictably reinforce and perpetuate segregation in
surrounding communities by exiling people of color, forcing them to seek
housing in already segregated communities, and recreating conditions in
those communities that are among the drivers of systemic segregation. 209 As
the previous Part analyzed some of the normative concerns raised by crime-

demonstrate that the Orlando crime-free program has been interpreted to not require a conviction in order to allow landlords to take action against residents. See 9 Investigates, supra
note 134 (discussing one Orlando resident who was evicted within one week of being caught
smoking marijuana).
206 . See infra notes 210–244 and accompanying text. See generally Report to the United
Nations on Racial Disparities in the U .S . Criminal Justice System, SENT’G PROJECT (Apr. 19,
2018),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/un-report-on-racial-disparities/
[https://perma.cc/BLR4-NT73] (documenting the racial disparities in policing, pretrial detention, sentencing, parole, and post-prison experiences).
207. Although this Article uses national statistics to illustrate the potential for crime-free
housing ordinances to perpetuate segregation, determining whether a policy or practice has a
segregative effect will ultimately be a case-specific inquiry, largely driven by local data. See, e .g .,
Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 56 F.3d 1243, 1253 (10th
Cir. 1995) (“In some cases national statistics may be the appropriate comparable population . . . . However, those cases are the rare exception . . . .” (citation omitted)).
208 . See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, CATEGORICALLY UNEQUAL: THE AMERICAN
STRATIFICATION SYSTEM 6, 18 (2007) (discussing the impact of “opportunity hoarding”).
209. Specific challenges to crime-free municipal ordinances brought under the segregative effects clause will need to establish the impact that crime-free municipal ordinances have
in those specific communities. See, e .g ., Boykin v. Gray, 895 F. Supp. 2d 199, 213–14 (D.D.C.
2012) (noting that courts have recognized allegations of a racially segregative effect under the
Fair Housing Act “as a form of disparate impact”). However, there are certain principles, realities, and facts that make the impact on segregation probable. See, e .g ., Report to the United Nations, supra note 206.
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free ordinances, this Part will analyze the potential of crime-free ordinances
to further systemic racial exclusion.
At every stage along the spectrum of contacts with the criminal legal system, Black people are overrepresented. There are more Black people in prison than people of any other racial or ethnic group. 210 There are also disparidisparities in incarceration rates. “Black men are seven times more likely to
go to prison than white men; black women are eight times more likely to go
than are white women.” 211 The disparities are most stark in state prisons. In
Iowa, Minnesota, New Jersey, Vermont, and Wisconsin, incarceration rates
are more than ten times higher for Black residents than for White residents. 212 “In eleven states, at least 1 in 20 adult black males is in state prison.” 213 And, “[o]n any given day, nearly one-third of black men in their
twenties are under the supervision of the criminal justice system.” 214 As
Dorothy Roberts puts it, “African Americans experience a uniquely astronomical rate of imprisonment.” 215
In Gregory v . Litton Systems, Inc ., 216 a federal district court observed that
Black people are arrested at a disproportionate rate compared to White people and held that “any policy that disqualifies prospective employees because
of having been arrested once, or more than once, discriminates in fact
against [Black] applicants.” 217 The disparities have only gotten more glaring
since this 1970 decision. For example, in 2013, Black people were arrested at
a rate more than double their proportion to the general population. 218 “Police arrest black Americans for drug crimes at twice the rate of whites, according to federal data, despite the fact that whites use drugs at comparable
rates . . . .” 219 For example, from 1995 to 2005, Black people “comprised ap210 . See JENNIFER BRONSON & E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
PRISONERS IN 2017, at 6 (2019); see also Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass
Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1272 (2004).
211. CLEAR, supra note 10, at 63.
212. ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACIAL AND
ETHNIC DISPARITY IN STATE PRISONS 3 (2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content
/uploads/2016/06/The-Color-of-Justice-Racial-and-Ethnic-Disparity-in-State-Prisons.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U9J6-LBK7].
213 . Id .
214. Roberts, supra note 210, at 1272.
215 . Id . at 1272–73.
216. 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
217 . Gregory, 316 F. Supp. at 403.
218 . See Population, by Race and Ethnicity: 2013, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 11, 2015),
https://www.pewhispanic.org/ph_2015-03_statistical-portrait-of-hispanics-in-the-unitedstates-2013_current-01/ [https://perma.cc/U7MK-PUJH] (12.3 percent of the U.S. population
in 2013 was Black); FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION: CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERVS. DIV.,
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2013, tbl.43A (2014), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2013
/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/tables/table-43 [https://perma.cc/4ERT-VZ6V] (28.3 percent of those
arrested in 2013 were Black).
219. Andrew Kahn & Chris Kirk, What It’s Like to Be Black in the Criminal Justice System, SLATE (Aug. 9, 2015, 12:11 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2015/08/racial-
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proximately 13 percent of drug users but . . . 46% of those convicted of drug
offenses.” 220
A hallmark of the criminal legal system is targeted policing and criminalization of poor communities of color. There is a general perception that
Black people are disproportionately targeted by the police. 221 Empirical evidence supports this perception; numerous studies have confirmed that police
stop Black people at a higher rate than White people. 222 Nationally, Black
people are more likely to be pulled over by the police 223 and, in one study,
are less likely to receive a citation after being pulled over than White people. 224 Moreover, “[p]olice are three times as likely to search the cars of
stopped black drivers than stopped white drivers.” 225
The statistics revealed in Floyd v . City of New York, 226 a class action challenging New York City’s aggressive stop-and-frisk practices, provide a sobering example. The NYPD’s aggressive policing under stop and frisk caused
the number of police stops to increase from 160,851 in 2003 to a peak of
685,724 in 2011. 227 The majority of stops were of Black and Latinx people. 228
From 2004 to 2012, the New York City Police Department made almost five
million stop-and-frisk stops. 229 Black and Latinx people accounted for more
than 80% of them; 52% of those stopped were Black and 31% were Latinx. 230
During this period, New York City’s population was 23% Black, 29% Latinx,
and 33% White. 231 To put these numbers in further perspective, police stops

disparities-in-the-criminal-justice-system-eight-charts-illustrating-how-its-stacked-againstblacks.html [https://perma.cc/BQM3-MK8Y].
220. NELLIS, supra note 212, at 10.
221 . See, e .g ., Devon W. Carbado, Blue-On-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some
of the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1479 (2016) (listing the variables that contribute to the systemic targeting of Black communities by police).
222. Matthew Bloch et al., Stop, Question and Frisk in New York Neighborhoods, N.Y.
TIMES (July 11, 2010), https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/07/11
/nyregion/20100711-stop-and-frisk.html?action [https://perma.cc/PT8D-QWDT] (presenting
statistics that show the disproportionate rates at which Black and Latinx people were stopped
under the NYPD’s stop and frisk policy); Fagan et al., supra note 192, at 560 (collecting studies); Tatiana Pina, New Study Shows Racial Disparities in Rhode Island Traffic Stops,
PROVIDENCE J. (Jan. 16, 2014, 9:49 PM), https://www.providencejournal.com/article/20140116
/NEWS/301169879 [https://perma.cc/96PQ-NEM2] (presenting evidence showing that police
in Rhode Island stopped drivers of color at a disproportionate rate).
223. Kahn & Kirk, supra note 219.
224. Pina, supra note 222.
225. Kahn & Kirk, supra note 219.
226. 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
227 . Stop-and-Frisk Data, NYCLU, https://www.nyclu.org/en/stop-and-frisk-data
[https://perma.cc/T6JL-QTJ5].
228 . See id .
229 . Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 556.
230 . Id . at 556, 558–59
231 . Id . at 559.
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of White people were 2.6% of the White population of New York City. 232 In
contrast, stops of Black people were 21.1% of the Black population of New
York City. 233 One study estimated that the probability of being stopped by
police for Black men ages eighteen to nineteen residing in New York City in
2006 was as high as 80%. 234 Police rarely recover evidence of crimes during
these stops, and, in 88% of the stops, they do not even make an arrest. 235
New York City is not alone. From 2012 to 2014, Black people made up
67% of the population in Ferguson, Missouri. 236 Yet, they “account[ed] for
85% of vehicle stops, 90% of citations, and 93% of arrests.” 237 Black people
were twice as likely to be searched during a vehicle stop, but were found in
possession of contraband 26% less often than White people. 238 Indeed, studies have found similar disparities around the country. 239
During the Obama Administration, several federal agencies initiated
programs designed to increase awareness of the potential disparate impact of
relying on criminal records in important housing and employment decisions, and sought to mitigate the collateral consequences of a criminal record. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and the Department
of Labor (DOL) each issued guidance on the potential for racial discrimination based on use of an individual’s criminal record.

232. Press Release, ACLU, Analysis of New NYPD Stop-and-Frisk Data Reveals Dramatic Impact on Black New Yorkers (Nov. 26, 2007), http://aclu.org/racialjustice
/racialprofiling/33095prs20071126.html [https://perma.cc/KH89-YVUR].
233 . Id .
234. Jeffrey Fagan et al., Street Stops and Broken Windows Revisited: The Demography
and Logic of Proactive Policing in a Safe and Changing City, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND
POLICING: NEW AND ESSENTIAL READINGS 336 (Stephen K. Rice & Michael D. White eds.,
2009).
235 . Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 558–59.
236. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 4
(2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/
ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/TF7W-F96R].
237 . Id .
238 . Id .
239 . See, e .g ., Plaintiff’s Fifth Report to Court and Monitor of Stop and Frisk Practices at
13, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2015) (finding that 80.23 percent of the stops in Philadelphia were of minorities); IAN AYRES & JONATHAN BOROWSKY,
ACLU OF S. CAL., A STUDY OF RACIALLY DISPARATE OUTCOMES IN THE LOS ANGELES POLICE
DEPARTMENT 27 (2008), https://www.aclusocal.org/sites/default/files/wp-content/uploads
/2015/09/11837125-LAPD-Racial-Profiling-Report-ACLU.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZSJ-2WR2]
(finding that the stop rate was 3,400 stops higher per 10,000 residents for Black people than for
White people, and almost 360 stops higher for Latinx people than for White people); ACLU,
BLACK, BROWN AND TARGETED: A REPORT ON BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT STREET
ENCOUNTERS FROM 2007–2010 1 (2014) https://www.issuelab.org/resources/25157/25157.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BWH9-BDTZ] (analyzing more than 200,000 Boston Police Department
records of police–citizen encounters and concluding that Black people were subjected to 63
percent of these encounters while they were just 24 percent of the population).
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In 2016, HUD issued guidance detailing the extent to which reliance on
an individual’s criminal record could constitute racial discrimination under
the Fair Housing Act because of its disparate impact based on race or ethnicity. 240 The guidance first acknowledged that “many formerly incarcerated individuals, as well as individuals who were convicted but not incarcerated,
encounter significant barriers to securing housing, including public and other federally-subsidized housing.” 241 Furthermore, the guidance noted that
“even individuals who were arrested but not convicted face difficulty in securing housing based on their prior arrest.” 242 In addressing the potential for
racially disparate impact in the use of conviction and arrest records, the
guidance noted that Black and Latinx people “are arrested, convicted and incarcerated at rates disproportionate to their share of the general population.” 243 As a result, HUD warned, barriers to housing based on criminal
records are likely to have a disproportionate impact on Black and Latinx
people seeking housing. 244
In 2012, the EEOC released guidance clarifying how actions taken
against applicants or employees with criminal records could constitute disparate treatment and disparate impact under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. 245 After recounting a sampling of the data regarding racial disparities in the rates of arrests and convictions across the United States, the guidance concluded that “[n]ational data . . . supports a finding that criminal
record exclusions have a disparate impact based on race and national
origin.” 246 Indeed, numerous studies have confirmed the racially disparate
impact of reliance on criminal records in the employment context. 247 Fol-

240. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL GUIDANCE ON
APPLICATION OF FAIR HOUSING ACT STANDARDS TO THE USE OF CRIMINAL RECORDS BY
PROVIDERS OF HOUSING AND REAL ESTATE-RELATED TRANSACTIONS 1 (2016).
241 . Id .
242 . Id . at 2.
243 . Id .
244 . Id . The guidance also noted that “intentional discrimination in violation of the Act
occurs if a housing provider treats individuals with comparable criminal history differently
because of their race, national origin or other protected characteristic.” Id .
245 . See EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE NO. 915.002, CONSIDERATION OF ARREST
AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (2012). Note that the analysis under Title VII is similar to the analysis
under the FHA. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 240, at 5–6.
246. EEOC, supra note 245, at 10.
247 . E .g ., Pager, supra note 179, at 958 (discussing a study where Black college students
posing as high school graduates were found to be less likely to receive a job callback than
Whites with a recent felony criminal conviction); Johnathan J. Smith, Banning the Box but
Keeping the Discrimination?: Disparate Impact and Employers’ Overreliance on Criminal Background Checks, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 197, 198 (2014) (noting that employers have increasingly been conducting background checks on applicants, and that Black and Latinx people
are more likely to have criminal records than their White counterparts); see also Green v. Mo.
Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1295 (8th Cir. 1975) (finding that the plaintiffs established a prima facie showing of discrimination by revealing that a policy of denying employment to any-
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lowing the lead of the EEOC, in 2012, the DOL issued an advisory addressing the use of criminal records in employment decisions. 248 The DOL guidance clarified what the agency would consider a violation of Title VII’s
nondiscrimination for job postings, screenings, and referrals based on criminal conviction records. 249
B. The Perpetuation of Systemic Segregation in Surrounding Communities
It is axiomatic that housing policy in one community will have a ripple
effect in surrounding communities. 250 Concentrating Whiteness in one
community will make nearby communities more racially segregated. 251 Accordingly, while making White communities Whiter, crime-free ordinances
will also make nearby communities of color more segregated and marginalized. Evictions and exclusions based on criminal legal system contacts will
force the exiled people—most likely people of color—and their families to
seek housing in those surrounding communities. Given the realities of housing patterns in the United States and deeply entrenched systems of segregation, people of color excluded by crime-free ordinances will likely be
squeezed into predominantly minority communities, reinforcing racial segregation. People of color who are excluded by crime-free ordinances in one
community may also avoid seeking housing in other predominantly White
neighborhoods for fear of intolerance, prejudice, and violence, 252 a fear likely
reinforced by their experience seeking housing in or being evicted from
communities with crime-free ordinances.
By spatially concentrating people with criminal convictions or other
criminal legal system contacts into fewer communities, crime-free ordinances risk stigmatizing those communities, further perpetuating the negative
impacts of racial segregation. The stigma that follows formerly incarcerated

one with a criminal record “[disqualifies] black applicants or potential black applicants for employment at a substantially higher rate than whites”).
248. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ADVISORY: TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT GUIDANCE LETTER
NO. 31-11, at 1 (2012).
249 . Id . at 5–7.
250 . See Vicki Been et al., Supply Skepticism: Housing Supply and Affordability 4 (Oct.
26, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (arguing that
changes in housing demand and supply push people either out of a jurisdiction or force them
to turn to less expensive housing in the same city and that the “failure of supply to respond to
increased demand at the higher end will ripple through other submarkets as demand spills into
these markets and increases their prices and rents”).
251 . Cf . Maria Krysan et al., Does Race Matter in Neighborhood Preferences? Results from
a Video Experiment, 115 AM. J. SOC. 527, 527 (2009) (“The authors find that net of social class,
the race of a neighborhood’s residents significantly influenced how it was rated. Whites said
the all-white neighborhoods were most desirable.”).
252 . Id . at 533–34 (“An important factor shaping African-Americans’ racial residential
preferences is concern about possible discrimination in predominantly white neighborhoods,
as suggested by qualitative interview data and open-ended survey questions.”).
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people can attach to the communities in which they live. 253 Those communities in turn experience decline—social, economic, and political. 254 Racially
segregated housing patterns interact with socioeconomic status to produce
extreme spatial concentrations of incarceration in communities of color,
with Black communities feeling the brunt of this. 255 Moreover, formerly incarcerated people are more likely to live in communities of color already suffering from high levels of social and economic disadvantage and
deprivation. 256 Further concentrating people with criminal convictions and
others with criminal legal system contacts 257 by excluding these individuals
from neighboring communities will only exacerbate both the impact of concentrated incarceration on communities of color and, ultimately, racial segregation.
Communities that must absorb large numbers of people with criminal
convictions or individuals with other forms of criminal legal system involvement face a range of political, social, and economic challenges. 258
Crime-free ordinances exacerbate the obstacles these segregated communities face. For example, concentrated incarceration in predominantly poor
and minority neighborhoods erodes economic strength and increases
crime. 259 Research has shown that a high concentration of formerly incarcerated residents destabilizes the community and reproduces the underlying
forces that foster crime. 260
Spatially concentrated incarceration also constrains minority communities’ participation in the labor market and deepens the dearth of “social con-

253. Lyles-Chockley, supra note 173, at 270.
254 . Id . at 271; see also CLEAR, supra note 10, at 70–90 (discussing how communities are
affected by reentry); Cammett, supra note 1, at 1137–38; see also Jennifer Gonnerman, MillionDollar Blocks, VILLAGE VOICE (Nov. 9, 2004), https://www.villagevoice.com/2004/11/09/
million-dollar-blocks/ [https://perma.cc/2LMT-L665].
255. CLEAR, supra note 10, at 64; Lyles-Chockley, supra note 173, at 263 (“Because black
Americans tend to live in racially and economically segregated neighborhoods, their communities feel the brunt of these staggering incarceration figures.”).
256. TRAVIS ET AL., supra note 174, at 1 (“And this cycle of removal and return of large
numbers of individuals, mostly men, is increasingly concentrated in a relatively small number
of communities that already encounter enormous social and economic disadvantages.”); LylesChockley, supra note 173, at 263.
257. This phenomenon is referred to as the “concentration of incarceration.” See, e .g .,
Lyles-Chockley, supra note 173, at 278.
258 . See Roberts, supra note 210, at 1281 (“Mass imprisonment damages social networks,
distorts social norms, and destroys social citizenship.”); Thompson, supra note 171, at 283–85
(discussing the disproportionate impact that barriers to reentry have on families when the individual reentering society is a woman).
259. CLEAR, supra note 10, at 5, 10.
260 . Id . at 64–65; Todd R. Clear, The Problem with “Addition by Subtraction”: The Prison-Crime Relationship in Low-Income Communities, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 181, 193 (Marc Mauer & Meda
Chesney-Lind eds., 2002).
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nections to legal work within [a] neighborhood[].” 261 Employment discrimination against people with criminal records may also have a “spillover effect”
by generating employment discrimination against entire neighborhoods associated with high crime or incarceration rates” 262 and also making businesses reluctant to locate in those communities. 263 The stigma that Black people
with criminal convictions carry with them feeds a “devastating cycle in
which ex-offenders are unable to successfully integrate into their communities; their communities experience social, economic, and political decline;
and that decline contributes to the conditions that foster stigma-inducing
crime in the first place.” 264
Black communities, in particular, suffer from the stigma of concentrated
incarceration and the belief that “a community’s high incarceration rate is
proof that it is not a good place to live or conduct business.” 265 The result not
only is harmful for individual residents of those communities but also encourages further White flight and White self-segregation. Research has
shown that White population loss is “strongly associated with the socioeconomic decline of neighborhoods.” 266 It should not be a surprise that most
people with other options—disproportionately, White people—would avoid
or flee neighborhoods of concentrated poverty and instability that lack access to stable jobs, essential government services, and private investment.
Racial discrimination is also a factor reinforcing the general inclination that
White people may have to live in predominantly White communities. This
inclination is driven by anti-Black sentiments and stereotypes as well as the
real or perceived differences in the level of crime and quality of homes,
schools, services, and amenities between predominantly White and predominantly minority neighborhoods. 267
V.

THE POTENTIAL OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT OF 1968 AND THE
SEGREGATIVE EFFECTS CAUSE OF ACTION

Communities have a right to be safe. But they must pursue that goal in a
way that does not unnecessarily increase or perpetuate racial segregation.
Although the ostensible benefits of crime-free ordinances are significant, the
tenant-screening and eviction requirements common to these ordinances are

261. Roberts, supra note 210, at 1294.
262 . Id . (quoting Bruce Western et al., Black Economic Progress in the Era of Mass Imprisonment, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT, supra note 260, at 165, 178).
263. Lyles-Chockley, supra note 173, at 274–75.
264 . Id . at 271.
265 . Id . at 270.
266. Samuel H. Kye, The Persistence of White Flight in Middle-Class Suburbia, SOC. SCI.
RES., May 2018, at 38, 39–40 (citing William H. Frey, Black In-Migration, White Flight, and the
Changing Economic Base of the Central City, 85 AM. J. SOC. 1396 (1980)).
267. Krysan et al., supra note 251, at 543–44 (finding data to support the theory that
“whites who endorse negative stereotypes about African-Americans will, more than those who
do not endorse stereotypes, be influenced by neighborhood racial composition”).
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not sufficiently related to the goal of creating safe communities. These ordinances erect a racially exclusionary barrier too vast to justify the role they
will play in perpetuating racial segregation. It is becoming increasingly difficult to use the law to challenge racial inequality, in large part because proving a constitutional violation requires a showing of intentional
discrimination. 268 This is not, however, true with respect to the Fair Housing
Act of 1968. This Part will explore the potential to raise segregative effects
claims under the Fair Housing Act to challenge the racially exclusionary impact of crime-free housing ordinances.
A. The FHA’s Segregative Effects Provision
The Fair Housing Act of 1968 (FHA or the Act) can be a powerful tool
to address the racial segregation wrought by systemic exclusion through local laws. Although municipalities are traditionally afforded wide discretion
in zoning and setting other housing policies, 269 the Act is a check on that
wide discretion. 270 Indeed, it was designed to promote “open, integrated residential housing patterns and to prevent the increase of segregation . . . of
racial groups.” 271 The Act was passed pursuant to congressional authority
under the Thirteenth Amendment in order “to eliminate the badges and incidents of slavery” brought by housing discrimination. 272 In ruling on the
reach of the Civil Rights Act of 1866—also passed pursuant to Congress’s authority under the Thirteenth Amendment—the Supreme Court said that
“when racial discrimination herds men into ghettos and makes their ability
to buy property turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic of slavery.” 273

268. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1976) (holding that a showing of intentional discrimination is required to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
269 . See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 2, 7–9 (1974) (upholding an ordinance limiting the number of unrelated people who may live together in a home).
270. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 1974) (“The discretion of local zoning officials . . . must be curbed where ‘the clear result of such discretion is the
segregation of low-income Blacks from all White neighborhoods.’ ” (quoting Banks v. Perk,
341 F. Supp. 1175, 1180 (N.D. Ohio 1972))); id . at 1185 (“[W]hatever the law was once . . . we
now firmly recognize that the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair to private rights and the public interest as the perversity of a willful scheme.” (quoting
Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967))).
271. Otero v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1133–34 (2d Cir. 1973); see also Metro.
Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights (Arlington Heights II), 558 F.2d 1283, 1289
(7th Cir. 1977) (quoting Otero, 484 F.2d at 1134).
272. Mitchell v. Cellone, 389 F.3d 86, 87–88 (3d Cir. 2004) (reaffirming that the Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601–3619 to be a “valid exercise of congressional power under the
Thirteenth Amendment to eliminate [the] badges and incidents of slavery”); Black Jack, 508
F.2d at 1184 (“The Act was passed pursuant to congressional power under the Thirteenth
Amendment to eliminate the badges and incidents of slavery.”).
273. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437–43 (1968).
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The FHA has been most frequently used to combat traditional acts of intentional discrimination. But the Act also provides for two distinct types of
claims that challenge practices that have a disproportionately adverse effect
on minorities: disparate impact and segregative effects. 274 The segregative
effects cause of action prohibits policies or practices that harm communities
by “creat[ing], increas[ing], reinforc[ing], or perpetuat[ing] segregated housing patterns” without any requirement to establish intentional discrimination. 275 In focusing on the community-based impact of housing policies and
practices, the segregative effects provision presents a mechanism to prevent
predominantly White communities from fencing out integration and shines
a light on the perpetrators of exclusionary practices. The Act recognizes that
“conduct that has the necessary and foreseeable consequence of perpetuating
segregation can be as deleterious as purposefully discriminatory conduct in
frustrating the national commitment” to replace segregation with integrated
living patterns. 276
The Supreme Court’s decision in Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v . Inclusive Communities Project 277 partially lifted the cloud of
uncertainty that once hung over discriminatory effects theories of liability
under the FHA. 278 In affirming that disparate impact theories are cognizable
under the FHA, the Court found that such claims were consistent with the
central purpose of the Act. 279 The Court stated that the FHA mandates the
“removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers” and that this
mandate could not be fulfilled if policies and practices that arbitrarily create
discriminatory effects or perpetuate segregation continue unchecked. 280
Challenging “zoning laws and other housing restrictions that function unfairly to exclude minorities from certain neighborhoods without any sufficient justification” is “at the heartland of disparate-impact liability.” 281 The
Court also concluded that discriminatory effects theories play a critical role
274. Schwemm, supra note 28, at 710; see also Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2525 (2015).
275. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a) (2018).
276 . Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1289; see also Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409
U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (stating that the Fair Housing Act not only protects those against whom
“discrimination is directed but also those whose complaint is that the manner of managing a
housing project affects ‘the very quality of their daily lives’ ” (quoting Shannon v. U.S. Dep’t of
Hous. & Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809, 818 (3d Cir. 1970))).
277. 135 S. Ct. 2507.
278. Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Inclusive Communities, every circuit court to
address the question concluded that practices with a discriminatory effect were prohibited under the FHA without establishing proof of discriminatory intent. ROBERT G. SCHWEMM &
SARA K. PRATT, NAT’L FAIR HOUS. ALL., DISPARATE IMPACT UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT:
A PROPOSED APPROACH 3, 6–7 (2009). However, the Supreme Court had never directly addressed the question. Id . at 4.
279 . Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2521.
280 . Id . at 2522 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
281 . Id . at 2521–22.
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in unearthing discriminatory intent: they “permit[] plaintiffs to counteract
unconscious prejudices and disguised animus that escape easy classification
as disparate treatment. In this way disparate impact liability may prevent
segregated housing patterns that might otherwise result from covert and illicit stereotyping.” 282 Now, with the Court’s ratification, advocates should
explore the full potential of the Act to challenge exclusionary local laws, such
as crime-free housing ordinances. 283
In 2013, HUD promulgated regulations establishing 284 uniform standards for evaluating both types of FHA effects claims, with both types of
claims assessed using a single burden-shifting test. 285 Generally, under the
first step, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie
case that “a challenged practice caused or predictably will cause a discriminatory effect.” 286 If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant
bears the burden to prove that its “challenged practice is necessary to achieve
one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests.” 287 If the
defendant meets this burden, the final step shifts the burden back to the
plaintiff to establish that the defendant’s interest “could be served by another
practice that has a less discriminatory effect.” 288
In a segregative effects case, establishing a prima facie case under the
first step of the burden-shifting analysis requires three distinct elements—
the plaintiff must: (1) challenge a distinct practice or policy of the defendant;
(2) use statistical evidence to show that the identified practice creates, increases, reinforces, or perpetuates segregated housing patterns in the rele282 . Id . at 2522.
283. Despite the Court’s decision in Inclusive Communities, the current makeup of the
Supreme Court and the uncertainty of future appointments may indicate that now is not the
time to explore the limits of disparate impact under the FHA. In light of the conservative turn
of the Supreme Court, progressive advocates face a dilemma similar to the one faced by social
justice advocates in the 1990s. See Deborah N. Archer, Political Lawyering for the 21st Century,
DENV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 15–16) (on file with the Michigan Law Review). Social justice advocates may also use the threat of litigation to persuade local jurisdictions to change their housing policies without the need to actually file a lawsuit. See id .
(manuscript at 27). For example, after the threat of litigation, Hesperia, California, removed
provisions requiring mandatory evictions by police or landlords for tenants in violation of the
crime-free ordinance. De La Cruz, supra note 93.
284. HUD is the federal agency tasked with enforcing and administering the Fair Housing Act; therefore, HUD’s regulations are entitled to substantial deference. Meyer v. Holley,
537 U.S. 280, 287–88 (2003). Moreover, the regulations are virtually identical to the test the
Supreme Court adopted for disparate impact claims in Inclusive Communities. However, it is
important to note that HUD under the Trump Administration is currently reconsidering its
implementation of the disparate impact standard under the FHA. See Reconsideration of
HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg.
28560 (proposed June 20, 2018) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
285 . See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78
Fed. Reg. 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013); 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c) (2013).
286. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1).
287 . Id . § 100.500(c)(2).
288 . Id . § 100.500(c)(3).
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vant community; and (3) establish that the challenged practice is the cause of
the segregative effect. 289 The precise requirements under each stage of this
analysis are less well defined for segregative effects claims than they are for
disparate impact claims. In part, this is because segregative effects claims are
brought less frequently, and when they are brought, they have generally been
limited to zoning decisions or other local government actions that prevent
the development of a housing project in a predominantly White area. 290 Understanding the full reach of the segregative effects theory is further complicated because, unlike the disparate impact theory, segregative effects claims
are not analogous to Title VII disparate impact claims. 291 However, the limited case law on segregative effects claims and HUD guidance shed some
light on the ways the segregative effects theory can be used to prevent predominantly White communities from taking actions to shield their neighborhoods from integration, and also address the impact those actions have
on surrounding neighborhoods. 292
While crime-free housing ordinances are vulnerable to both types of
discriminatory effects causes of action, there are important distinctions between disparate impact claims and segregative effects claims that suggest the
latter may be better suited to challenge the predictable segregative effects of
crime-free housing ordinances in the housing market. 293 While disparate
impact claims focus on a particular policy, segregative effects claims may be
brought to challenge individual housing actions or decisions, in addition to

289. 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,468–69; Schwemm, supra note 28, at 712–13; see also Tex. Dep’t of
Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523–24 (2015) (discussing
the requirements a plaintiff must meet to make out a prima facie showing of disparate impact).
290. Schwemm, supra note 28, at 715, 737 (discussing the first cases brought as segregative effects claims and how they shaped the body of case law regarding this claim).
291 . Id . at 711.
292 . See generally, e .g ., Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d
926, 940–41 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[W]e conclude that the strong showing of discriminatory effect
resulting from the Town’s adherence to its R-3M zoning category and its refusal to rezone the
Matinecock Court site far outweigh the Town’s weak justifications.”); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.
v. Village of Arlington Heights (Arlington Heights II), 558 F.2d 1283, 1283 (7th Cir. 1977)
(holding that the Village of Arlington Heights “had [a] statutory obligation under the Fair
Housing Act to refrain from zoning policies that effectively foreclosed construction of any lowcost housing within its corporate boundaries”); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d
1179 (8th Cir. 1974) (striking down an ordinance prohibiting construction of new multifamily
dwellings); Dews v. Town of Sunnyvale, 109 F. Supp. 2d 526 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (finding town
zoning ordinances to have discriminatory effect and to have been maintained with discriminatory intent); Summerchase Ltd. P’ship I v. City of Gonzales, 970 F. Supp. 522, 541 (M.D. La.
1997) (denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the claim that the city’s refusal
to grant a permit “has a discriminatory effect on minorities because it has a segregative effect”).
293. Under the Obama Administration, HUD defended the important role of recognizing segregative effects claims in addition to disparate impact claims. HUD noted that the elimination of segregation was central to the enactment of the Fair Housing Act. 78 Fed. Reg. at
11,469.
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broad policies. 294 This distinction can be critical in challenging ostensibly individual housing determinations—such as a landlord’s decision to evict a
tenant or not rent to a prospective tenant—that cumulatively further racially
segregated housing patterns, particularly where those individual decisions
are in furtherance of an explicit community-based goal. In an example used
by the Supreme Court in Inclusive Communities, “a plaintiff challenging the
decision of a private developer to construct a new building in one location
rather than another will not easily be able to show this is a policy causing a
disparate impact because such a one-time decision may not be a policy at
all.” 295 Under a regime of crime-free ordinances, a municipality may argue
that an individual property owner’s decision whether to rent to a particular
tenant cannot be deemed a policy because of the unique factors that may attend each individual decision. But under a segregative effects cause of action,
a plaintiff can challenge the collective impact of a series of isolated decisions
(here, the seemingly individual decisions by a landlord) that converge to undermine the goal of combating segregation. 296
Disparate impact claims focus on how the challenged policy has affected
a specific group. 297 However, the reach and harms of segregation are not limited to one group of individuals. Significantly, segregative effects claims focus on the harm done to “the whole community,” 298 with the goal of
“achiev[ing] racial integration for the benefit of all people in the United
States.” 299 In focusing on the impact to “the whole community,” segregative

294 . See Inclusive Cmtys ., 135 S. Ct. at 2523 (indicating that a disparate impact claim can
only challenge a defendant’s policy, not a one-time decision); 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2018);
Schwemm, supra note 28, at 713; Robert G. Schwemm & Calvin Bradford, Proving Disparate
Impact in Fair Housing Cases After Inclusive Communities, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y
685, 691 (2016) (“Unlike disparate-impact claims, segregative-effect claims may challenge a
particular action or decision of the defendant as well as an across-the-board policy or practice.”). For examples of cases where the plaintiffs challenged individual housing decisions, see,
for example, Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at 937–941; Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d 1283;
Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179.
295 . Inclusive Cmtys ., 135 S. Ct. at 2523.
296. Because the exclusions and evictions ultimately are made in order to comply with a
housing ordinance, they are arguably a single, general policy. See Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. County
of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 619 (2d Cir. 2016) (finding a zoning policy at issue, rather than “ ‘oneoff’ zoning ‘decision[s],’ ” where individual zoning decision was linked to a required change in
local law to facilitate the construction).
297 . See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a) (“A practice has a discriminatory effect where it actually
or predictably results in a disparate impact on a group of persons or creates, increases, reinforces, or perpetuates segregated housing patterns because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.”).
298. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (quoting 114 CONG.
REC. 2706 (1968) (statement of Sen. Javits)); see also Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at 937; Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1290; Schwemm, supra note 28, at 714; Schwemm & Bradford,
supra note 294, at 691 (“Historically, most perpetuation-of-segregation claims have been made
against municipal defendants accused of blocking integrated housing developments in predominantly white areas.”).
299. H.R. Res. 1095, 110th Cong., 154 CONG. REC. H2280–01 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 2008).
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effects claims also have the potential to recognize not only the impact on racial segregation in the communities that adopt racially exclusionary policies
or practices, but also the ripple effects that adoption has in surrounding
communities. 300
In Metropolitan Housing Development Corp . v . Village of Arlington
Heights, the Seventh Circuit explained the distinction:
There are two kinds of racially discriminatory effects which a facially neutral decision about housing can produce. The first occurs when that decision has a greater adverse impact on one racial group than on another. The
second is the effect which the decision has on the community involved; if it
perpetuates segregation and thereby prevents interracial association it will
be considered invidious under the Fair Housing Act independently of the
extent to which it produces a disparate effect on different racial groups. 301

In Arlington Heights II, the court found a segregative effects claim viable
where a disparate impact claim failed because of the nature of the impact of
the challenged housing decision. In Arlington Heights II, plaintiffs sought to
compel the Village of Arlington Heights to rezone property to allow the construction of federally subsidized housing. 302 The plaintiff raised a disparate
impact and a segregative effects claim. 303 The court found the disparate impact argument to be “relatively weak” because although the village’s zoning
decision affected a significantly disproportionate percentage of minorities, the
decision also theoretically disadvantaged a greater number of White people
“because sixty percent of the people in the Chicago area eligible for federal
housing subsidization [at the time] were white.” 304 The court concluded that
“[t]he argument for racial discrimination [under a disparate impact theory]
is therefore not as strong as it would be if all or most of the group adversely
affected was nonwhite.” 305 However, relying on similar decisions in United

300 . See, e .g ., United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1183 (8th Cir. 1974)
(recognizing a segregative effects claim where the exclusion of Black people from the targeted
community resulted in the “confinement of a disproportionate number of them in overcrowded or substandard accommodations” in the city (quoting United States v. City of Black Jack,
372 F. Supp. 319, 325 (E.D. Mo. 1974))).
301 . Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1290; see also Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209–10
(“While members of minority groups were damaged the most from discrimination in housing
practices, the proponents of the legislation emphasized that those who were not the direct objects of discrimination had an interest in ensuring fair housing, as they too suffered.”).
302 . Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1285.
303 . See id . at 1283. The plaintiffs also alleged that the village’s actions violated their
rights under the Equal Protection Clause. Id . at 1286.
304 . Id . at 1291.
305 . Id . The court did not note, however, that a housing policy with an impact on both
white people and minorities is not automatically immune from challenge under a disparate
impact theory. Id . In United States v . City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, and Kennedy Park
Homes Ass’n v . City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), the courts found a disparate
impact claim despite an impact that was not limited to minorities.
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States v . Black Jack 306 and Kennedy Park, 307 the Arlington Heights II court
noted that this type of effect would not preclude a segregative effects cause of
action from proceeding:
What was present in Black Jack and Kennedy Park was a strong argument
supporting racially discriminatory impact in the second sense [involving
the perpetuation of segregation]. In each case the municipality or section of
the municipality in which the proposed project was to be built was overwhelmingly white. Moreover, in each case construction of low-cost housing
was effectively precluded throughout the municipality or section of the
municipality which was rigidly segregated. Thus, the effect of the municipal
action in both cases was to foreclose the possibility of ending racial segregation in housing within those municipalities. 308

Finally, the impact on segregation need not be substantial, 309 nor must
the challenged prohibition be the sole factor contributing to racial segregation in the community. 310 A segregative effects claim could be pursued where
the challenged action is moving a community from 80 percent White to 90
percent White, or where the challenged action blocks a move that would
have modestly decreased the percentage of White residents in a predominantly White community, because it “increases” or “reinforces” segregated
housing patterns. 311

306. In Black Jack, the city enacted a zoning ordinance prohibiting the construction of
new multiple-family dwellings. 508 F.2d at 1183.
307. In Kennedy Park, the city imposed a moratorium on the construction of new subdivisions, a category into which the proposed project fell. 436 F.2d at 111.
308 . Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1291.
309 . See Schwemm, supra note 28, at 740 (“Still, most courts have followed a similar
analysis; that is, so long as the plaintiff can show that a proposed housing development is likely
to include a sizeable portion of minorities, e.g., because it is subsidized in a racially diverse
metropolitan area, a heavily white municipality that blocks such a project is perpetuating segregation.”).
310. Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 937 (2d Cir.
1988) (finding a violation of segregative effects where a housing development with the goal of
achieving a 25 percent minority population “would begin desegregating” a predominantly
White neighborhood and a discriminatory effect where a disproportionately large percentage
of minority households would be affected); Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1186 (“Black Jack’s action is
but one more factor confining blacks to low-income housing in the center city, confirming the
inexorable process whereby the St. Louis metropolitan area becomes one that ‘has the racial
shape of a donut, with the Negroes in the hole and with mostly Whites occupying the ring.’ ”
(quoting Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth., 355 F. Supp. 1257, 1260 (N.D. Ohio
1973))). But see Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2514 (2015) (“If a statistical discrepancy is caused by factors other than the defendant’s
policy, a plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case . . . .”).
311. Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. County of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 620 (2d Cir. 2016) (finding
that a restriction on multifamily housing “perpetuates segregation generally because it decreases the availability of housing to minorities in a municipality where minorities constitute” a
small percentage of the population (quoting Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. County of Nassau, 843 F.
Supp. 2d 287, 329 (E.D.N.Y. 2012))); Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at 937–38 (finding that an
ordinance restricting construction of low-income housing with a disproportionate percentage
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B. Applying the FHA to Crime-Free Ordinances
Plaintiffs challenging a crime-free ordinance using a segregative effects
cause of action will likely be able to establish a prima facie case. As discussed
earlier, a policy that melds the criminal legal system and private housing
market creates an all-encompassing web that will squeeze people of color out
of communities and predictably further segregation. Crime-free ordinances
increase, reinforce, and perpetuate segregated housing patterns because of
their overbreadth. The exclusion and eviction of tenants based on contact
with the criminal legal system imports the racial impacts of that system into
an already segregated housing system. These ordinances may deter people
with criminal legal contacts from ever looking for housing in the community, because they know they are not wanted, believe they will not make it
through the background check, or fear the harassment, surveillance, and invasion of privacy that will come with living in a “crime-free” community.
The potential impact is exacerbated by the racial realities of who is likely to
rent their home compared to who is likely to own their home in the communities in which these ordinances are adopted. 312
If a plaintiff is able to make out a prima facie case, the defendant will
bear the burden to prove that its “challenged practice is necessary to achieve
one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests.” 313 In determining whether the asserted interest rises to the level of a compelling governmental interest, a court must examine whether the public interest served
by the ordinance is constitutionally permissible and whether the ordinance
in fact furthers the governmental interest asserted. 314
of minority residents to an “urban renewal area” that was already 52 percent minority “significantly perpetuated segregation in the Town”); id . at 937 (finding a segregative effects violation
where a housing development with a goal of a 25 percent minority population “would begin
desegregating” a predominantly white neighborhood); id . (finding a discriminatory effect
where a disproportionately large percentage of minority households would be affected); Black
Jack, 508 F.2d at 1186 (finding a violation of the segregative effects cause of action where a
housing development that would meet the housing needs of a class of people that were 32 percent Black was excluded because “[t]here was ample proof that many blacks would live in the
development, and that the exclusion of the townhouses would contribute to the perpetuation
of segregation in a community which was 99 percent white”).
312 . See Demographic Characteristics for Occupied Housing Units, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_17_5Y
R_S2502&prodType=table (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (indicating that Whites
make up 76.8 percent of owner-occupied housing units). Crime-free ordinances also have the
ability to exacerbate racial segregation by reducing the supply of rental housing in a community. See WERTH, supra note 1, at 5. If a landlord does not comply with orders to evict a tenant,
the landlord’s license can be revoked. Id . An unlicensed landlord cannot rent their property.
Id . Rental revocations can decrease the availability of rental housing in a community, and decreases in rental housing disproportionately impact minorities, who make up just over 23 percent of owner-occupied housing units. Id . This aspect of crime-free ordinances is not
addressed in this Article.
313. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(2) (2018).
314 . See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (“But in moving from State to
State or to the District of Columbia appellees were exercising a constitutional right, and any
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Generally, communities that adopt crime-free ordinances assert that enforcement of the ordinance will result in a reduction of crime, increased
property values, improved quality of life, and safer rental properties. 315
While improving safety on rental properties—and all of the residual benefits
asserted to come with that safety—is a legitimate community interest, 316
crime-free housing ordinances are not “necessary” to municipalities’ interest
in reducing crime. In light of the widespread racial bias and disparities in the
criminal legal system, criminal legal system contacts will always be a problematic measure for access to housing. Moreover, because crime-free ordinances rely solely on arrests, penalize individuals for the conduct of friends
or family members, and rely on an unconstrained range of previous convictions as indicators of future dangerousness, plaintiffs can argue that these
ordinances will have a marginal impact on reducing crime at best, but have
profound potential to deepen racial segregation.
First, crime-free ordinances are not necessary to improve safety to the
extent that they rely on arrests or police suspicion to justify evictions or refusals to rent. 317 Neither an arrest nor police suspicion is proof that an individual has engaged in any criminal conduct, much less proof of their
propensity to do so in the future. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he mere fact that a man has been arrested has very little, if any,
probative value in showing that he has engaged in any misconduct. An arrest
shows nothing more than that someone probably suspected the person apprehended of an offense.” 318 Lower federal courts have similarly found arrests to be of little probative value in determining whether a person engaged
in any criminal conduct. 319 Moreover, in the specific context of landlord reliclassification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to
promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional.”).
315 . See, e .g ., Crime Free Multi-Housing, supra note 4 (warning that “drug criminals and
other destructive tenants” operating out of rental units cause property damage, a decline in
property value, and fires, in addition to presenting threats to other tenants’ safety); Crime Free
Multi-Housing Program, DUBLIN, CAL., http://www.ci.dublin.ca.us/118/Crime-Free-MultiHousing-Program [https://perma.cc/EG55-6YRW] (“[P]roperty managers will reap the benefits of reduced crime, better community awareness, increased property values, more attractive
neighborhoods, advertisement of participation, and improved quality of life.”).
316 . See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507,
2524 (2015) (warning against a broad interpretation of disparate-impact liability that would
prevent government entities and private parties from, among other things, “ensuring compliance with health and safety codes”).
317. As discussed supra Section II.B.3, under ICFA’s model and municipal ordinances
adopted around the country, a tenant risks eviction if he or she has engaged in or facilitated an
act of criminal activity—which could potentially be understood broadly enough to include an
arrest, or a stop resulting in neither arrest nor conviction.
318. Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 241 (1957).
319 . See, e .g ., United States v. Berry, 553 F.3d 273, 284 (3d Cir. 2009) (“We therefore follow . . . the majority of our sister appellate courts and hold that a bare arrest record—without
more—does not justify an assumption that a defendant has committed other crimes and it
therefore can not support increasing his/her sentence in the absence of adequate proof of criminal activity.”); United States v. Zapete-Garcia, 447 F.3d 57, 60 (1st Cir. 2006) (“[A] mere ar-
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ance on arrest records in assessing whether a potential tenant or tenant creates a safety risk to other tenants, HUD has cautioned that
[b]ecause arrest records do not constitute proof of past unlawful conduct
and are often incomplete (e .g ., by failing to indicate whether the individual
was prosecuted, convicted, or acquitted), the fact of an arrest is not a reliable basis upon which to assess the potential risk to resident safety or property posed by a particular individual. For that reason, a housing provider
who denies housing to persons on the basis of arrests not resulting in conviction cannot prove that the exclusion actually assists in protecting resident
safety and/or property. 320

In a parallel context, the EEOC has advised that rejecting employment
applicants on the basis of arrest records is inconsistent with the business necessity defense under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, again because
an arrest alone does not establish that the individual has engaged in any
criminal conduct. 321 Courts considering the legality of using arrest records to
make hiring decisions have reached a similar conclusion. For example, in
Gregory v . Litton Systems, Inc., the California district court held that an employer’s policy of excluding people with arrests, but no convictions, from
employment discriminated against Black applicants in violation of Title VII
because there was “no evidence to support a claim that persons who have
suffered no criminal convictions but have been arrested on a number of occasions can be expected, when employed, to perform less efficiently or less
honestly than other employees.” 322 The court went on to say that a “record of
arrests without convictions, is irrelevant to [a person’s] suitability or qualification for employment.” 323
In communities around the country, Black and Latinx people are arrested at astronomical rates, disproportionate to their rate in the general population and compared to White people. 324 While arrests do not establish any
involvement in criminal activity, their use in crime-free housing ordinances

rest, especially a lone arrest, is not evidence that the person arrested actually committed any
criminal conduct.”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 240, at 5 (noting
the Supreme Court’s decision in Schware); Anna Roberts, Arrests as Guilt, 70 ALA. L. REV. 987
(2019) (examining how the general, incorrect fusion of arrest and guilt spells out the need for
different kinds of criminal justice reform). But see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (rejecting the claim that there is a constitutional right to privacy in arrest information).
320. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 240, at 5 (emphasis added).
321. EEOC, supra note 245, at 12, 40 n.103 (“The mere fact that a [person] has been arrested has very little, if any, probative value in showing that he has engaged in any misconduct.” (quoting Schware, 353 U.S. at 241)).
322. 316 F. Supp. 401, 402 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
323 . Gregory, 316 F. Supp. at 403.
324. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 240, at 2; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
NO SECOND CHANCE: PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS DENIED ACCESS TO PUBLIC HOUSING
84 (2004), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usa1104.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Z8FD-2SPU] (“Racial disparities among those arrested, sentenced, and incarcerated for criminal offenses in the United States are immense . . . .”).
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contributes substantially to the disproportionate impact on Black and Latinx
tenants and housing applicants and to the potential for segregative impact. 325
Making housing actions based on stops or police suspicion is even more
flimsy than those based on arrests, and even more likely to contribute to the
perpetuation of racial segregation. 326 Because the Court has set the legal bar
justifying a stop so low 327 and virtually removed it for police suspicion, these
provisions create the opportunity for broad abuse. 328 Essentially, many
crime-free housing ordinances allow police officers to pick and choose who
may live in their community simply by making the unreviewable assertion
that an applicant or tenant is under suspicion of illegal activity. 329
Unguided and unrestrained reliance on criminal history records also
contributes to racial exclusion. Criminal records have become widely available and easily accessible. 330 In light of the relative ease in obtaining criminal

325 . See Aleksandar Tomic & Jahn K. Hakes, Case Dismissed: Police Discretion and Racial
Differences in Dismissals of Felony Charges, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 110 (2008) (finding evidence that Blacks are erroneously arrested on certain felony charges at a higher rate than
Whites); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 324, at 83 (“African Americans are also
disproportionately represented among those who have criminal records, and as such are much
more likely to be rejected for public housing on this basis.”); supra notes 187–202 and accompanying text.
326 . See supra Part IV.
327 . See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (permitting a police officer to conduct a stop
and frisk on the basis of reasonable suspicion as opposed to the probable cause standard required for arrests); see also Gregory Howard Williams, The Supreme Court and Broken Promises: The Gradual but Continual Erosion of Terry v. Ohio, 34 HOW. L.J. 567 (1991) (detailing the
ways in which cases following Terry have increased police’s ability to stop and frisk suspects on
the basis of a number of factors, including race).
328 . See Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 820 (2015) (“Recent litigation over New York City’s stop-and-frisk policy highlights the racial impact that ordermaintenance policing can have. . . . While the vast majority of those subject to Terry stops were
not arrested, blacks were thirty percent more likely to be arrested for the same alleged crime
than similarly situated whites.”); Roberts, supra note 319, at 6–7; Williams, supra note 327, at
569 (detailing the author’s father’s experience of being arrested by a police officer who told the
father, “I’m arresting you on suspicion of burglary, and the law says I can keep your black ass
in jail for seven days before I charge you”).
329 . See WERTH supra note 1, at 4. Most tenants do not challenge their evictions, making
the decision to evict effectively the final decision. See Been & Bozorg, supra note 64, at 1432
(noting that tenants “face considerable challenges in housing court” and have a high rate of
default judgments against them). The eviction itself also leads to future problems. “The mark
of eviction on one’s record often prevents tenants from securing affordable housing in a decent
neighborhood, and it disqualifies them from many housing programs.” Matthew Desmond &
Nicol Valdez, Unpolicing the Urban Poor: Consequences of Third-Party Policing for Inner-City
Women, 78 AM. SOC. REV. 117, 137 (2013); see also MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY
AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY (2017) (describing the ways in which eviction can affect
people’s lives).
330 . See James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of
Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177 (2008); see also James B. Jacobs, Mass
Incarceration and the Proliferation of Criminal Records, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 387, 395 (2006)
(“At least ten (open-records) states treat criminal conviction records as public documents; at
least three states provide that any member of the public may, for a fee, obtain any person’s rap
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records, landlords and other housing providers have embraced them as tools
to assess the suitability of potential tenants. 331 The result is an increased likelihood that an individual will be rejected for housing because of his or her
criminal record. 332 Although a criminal conviction is evidence that an individual engaged in criminal conduct, municipalities that employ broad or
blanket policies requiring or encouraging exclusion or evictions will have
difficulty establishing that the ordinance is necessary to achieve its interest in
safety.
It is, arguably, understandable that a landlord might have concerns
about renting to certain people with criminal convictions; a landlord might
worry, for example, that a recently released arsonist may present a future
danger to other tenants and his property. 333 But there is an important distinction between landlords making individual determinations about specific
applicants and municipalities mandating exclusion through ordinances. The
law should not paint all people with criminal convictions with the same
brush. 334 Plaintiffs could argue that crime-free housing ordinances are overbroad to the extent that they require landlords to consider prospective tenants’ criminal histories without considering the nature of the conviction,
when it took place, or its relevance to the other tenants’ safety. Crime-free
ordinances that exclude people with a conviction regardless of how old the

sheet.”); Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice System: Information Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement Exemptions, 111 MICH. L.
REV. 485, 511 (2013) (“Indeed, federal law has arguably made criminal records more accessible.”).
331. Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 330, at 177–78.
332 . See JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER
REENTRY 145–48 (2009) (discussing the obstacles that public housing law and practice present
for applicants with criminal records).
333. There is evidence that recidivism rates are declining. Adam Gelb & Tracy Velázquez,
The Changing State of Recidivism: Fewer People Going Back to Prison, PEW (Aug. 1, 2018),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2018/08/01/the-changing-stateof-recidivism-fewer-people-going-back-to-prison [https://perma.cc/263N-ZMAH] (reporting
that “[t]he share of people who return to state prison three years after being released . . .
dropped by nearly a quarter” between 2005 and 2012). Ironically, the lack of access to safe, affordable housing is among the key contributors to high recidivism rates. See CLEAR, supra note
10, at 58–60 (discussing the cyclical effects of policies targeting people who have been released
from prison); Archer & Williams, supra note 171, at 539 (“Denial of subsistence benefits and
subsidized housing makes it harder for ex-offenders both to meet the basic needs of their families and to exercise the economic and personal autonomy that many take for granted.”); Favors, supra note 171, at 62–63 (discussing reasons why housing poses a problem for individuals
reentering their communities after being incarcerated); Thompson, supra note 171, at 278
(“Housing has always presented a problem for individuals returning to their communities following a period of incarceration.”).
334. Regardless of whether a landlord may have a legitimate concern about renting to a
specific person, as a general matter people with criminal convictions must be able to find a
place to live upon returning home. Communities should not be able to ban them from living in
private rental housing, especially not without provision of comparable housing elsewhere in
the community.
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conviction is, 335 the nature of the underlying conduct, or the individual’s
postconviction record cannot meet defendants’ heavy burden under the segregative effects clause of serving a “substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory
interest[]” of improving safety. 336
Here, an analysis under Title VII offers instructive guidance. In Green v .
Missouri Pacific Railroad Co ., the Eighth Circuit held that a blanket ban on
hiring people with a criminal record violated Title VII. The court could “not
conceive of any business necessity that would automatically place every individual convicted of any offense, except a minor traffic offense, in the permanent ranks of the unemployed.” 337 Similarly, no court can justify a rule that
places any individual convicted of any offense in the permanent ranks of the
homeless. Municipalities and landlords should be required to show that their
crime-free ordinances effectively and accurately “distinguish[] between
criminal conduct that indicates a demonstrable risk to resident safety and/or
property and criminal conduct that does not.” 338 Crime-free ordinances
make no such distinction. Rather, ordinances encourage landlords to cast an
exceedingly wide net in considering convictions and other criminal legal system contacts.
Reliance on criminal history records is also problematic because of the
degree of inaccuracy in commercial databases. These databases and services,
particularly those that rely on name-based searches, are often riddled with
errors. 339 Specifically, many of these commercial databases report outdated
convictions that have been reversed or expunged, report as felonies convictions that were ultimately downgraded to misdemeanors, include criminal
records wrongly attributed to innocent individuals (including victims of
identity theft), and incorrectly report multiple instances of what was actually
a single criminal act. 340 Significantly, “there is no mechanism for correcting

335. Passage of time is a particularly important factor given research that shows that
“over time, the likelihood that a person with a prior criminal record will engage in additional
criminal conduct decreases until it approximates the likelihood that a person with no criminal
history will commit an offense.” U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 240, at 7; see
also Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Redemption in the Presence of Widespread Criminal Background Checks, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 327, 332–33 (2009) (claiming that, as time passes
after a person’s last criminal act, there is a point at which the risk of their reoffending subsides
to the level of the general population).
336. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(2) (2018).
337. Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1298 (8th Cir. 1975).
338. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 240, at 6 (citing El v. Se. Pa. Transp.
Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 244–45 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that “Title VII . . . require[s] that the [criminal conviction] policy under review accurately distinguish between applicants that pose an
unacceptable level of risk and those that do not”)).
339 . See CRAIG N. WINSTON, NAT’L ASS’N OF PROF’L BACKGROUND SCREENERS, THE
NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER: A REVIEW AND EVALUATION 14–15 (2005) (finding
that “[s]erious problems remain in the process to link dispositional information to the proper
case and charge”).
340. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 240, at 6 n.29 (noting that databases
may be outdated and contain errors); PERSIS S. YU & SHARON M. DIETRICH, NAT’L CONSUMER
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or altering” incorrect information reported by online providers. 341 And
crime-free housing ordinances fail to require safeguards against erroneous
reporting that many employers, licensing bureaus, and financial institutions
use when checking criminal history information. 342
In rebuttal, there is a strong likelihood that a plaintiff could establish
that a municipality’s interest in improving safety and reducing crime in rental properties can be served through less discriminatory means. 343 To truly
minimize the potential for advancing or perpetuating segregation, municipal
housing ordinances should not rely on contacts with the criminal legal system as a measure of the danger a tenant poses to his neighbors. At a minimum, the segregative effects of these ordinances could be reduced by
significantly narrowing their reach.
First, exclusions and evictions based on arrests and suspicions do little to
target actual crime, but their inclusion is a significant driver of racial exclusion. The majority of stops and arrests of people of color are for relatively
minor infractions that evince no signs of future dangerousness, and the discretion inherent in a decision to arrest is often employed in racially discriminatory ways. 344 If contacts with the criminal legal system must be a factor,
municipalities should require a criminal conviction—arrests and accusations

LAW CTR., BROKEN RECORDS: HOW ERRORS BY CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKING
COMPANIES HARM WORKERS AND BUSINESSES 26 (2012), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/prreports/broken-records-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6A8-YE8A] (“Background screening
agencies are also known to report single arrests or incidents multiple times.”); Sharon M. Dietrich, Preventing Background Screeners from Reporting Expunged Criminal Cases, SARGENT
SHRIVER NAT’L CTR. ON POVERTY L. (Apr. 2015), http://povertylaw.org/clearinghouse/stories
/dietrich [https://perma.cc/8JTN-YHZL] (“But around the country the commercial background-screening industry, which runs the lion’s share of the background checks obtained by
employers and landlords, sometimes reports these expunged cases long after they have been
removed from the public record.”); Michael Liedtke, This Woman Learned the Hard Way that
Background Checks May Contain Huge Errors, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 17, 2011, 7:46 AM), https://
www.businessinsider.com/this-woman-learned-the-hard-way-that-background-checks-maycontain-huge-errors-2011-12 [https://perma.cc/ST2Q-37KE] (telling the stories of multiple
people who lost job offers or suffered other injuries due to erroneous reporting by background
check companies).
341. Shawn Bushway et al., Private Providers of Criminal History Records: Do You Get
What You Pay For?, in BARRIERS TO REENTRY? THE LABOR MARKET FOR RELEASED PRISONERS
IN POST-INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 174, 192 (Shawn Bushway et al. eds., 2007) (“An individual who
wants to correct an error in the private system would have to deal with each and every company who provides information on background checks, a nearly impossible task.”).
342 . See, e .g ., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (2012) (requiring “that consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for
consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair and
equitable to the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper
utilization of such information”).
343. First, it is important to note that in many municipalities there is strong evidence of
intentional racial discrimination surrounding the adoption of crime-free housing ordinances.
So there may be open questions as to actual motivation.
344 . See K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 280–92 (2009).
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should not form the basis to deny a housing application or trigger eviction
proceedings.
Municipalities could also stop encouraging or requiring landlords to penalize tenants without regard to their knowledge of or responsibility for the
alleged crime at issue. Many crime-free lease addenda seek to hold tenants
responsible for crimes or actions they did not commit by virtue of their familial or social relationships. 345 Evicting people without regard to their
knowledge of or responsibility for the crime is not a reasonable measure to
assess the suitability of a tenant, but will further racial exclusion.
Where convictions are considered, municipalities can require landlords
to limit segregative impact by precluding unrestrained reliance on criminal
history records. Ordinances could require landlords to focus on convictions
for the types of crimes that may be harmful to the community, as supported
by empirical evidence. 346 Municipalities that insist on using criminal history
should be required to employ reasonable look-back periods and conduct an
individualized assessment of relevant mitigating information beyond that
contained in an individual’s criminal background check. Relevant factors
might include the individual’s postconviction rental history, the nature of
the underlying conduct, the age of the conviction, the age of the individual at
the time of conviction, and the individual’s postconviction record generally. 347 These measures are analogous to the guidelines the EEOC has endorsed
when potential employers choose to rely on criminal history. 348 Finally, municipalities could limit the points at which criminal history may be consid-

345 . E .g ., SCHAUMBURG, ILL., CODE § 99.10.05(F)(3)–(4) (2015) (establishing liability for
the tenant whether or not the guest is under their control); FARIBAULT, MINN., CODE § 7-43(1)
(2017) (“It shall be the responsibility of the licensee to prevent disorderly conduct by tenants
and their guests on the licensed premises.”); see also Landlords Sue City, supra note 205 (discussing the Cedar Rapids, Iowa lease addendum that held tenants responsible for acts committed by guests).
346. Many categories of institutions must pass a high burden when they seek to increase
diversity and take measures to make their institutions more diverse and inclusive. See, e .g .,
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (applying strict scrutiny and finding that the law
school had a compelling interest in taking race into account in order to improve diversity given
the school’s highly individualized and comprehensive review of each applicant). Municipalities
seeking to exclude or evict individuals using racialized criteria should be required to meet a
similar burden and rely on empirical evidence rather than instinct, stereotypes, misperceptions, and bias.
347 . See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 240, at 7 (suggesting certain
factors that may be used to screen applicants, because “individualized assessment of relevant
mitigating information beyond that contained in an individual’s criminal record is likely to
have a less discriminatory effect than categorical exclusions that do not take such additional
information into account”).
348. EEOC, supra note 245, at 2 (advising employers who wish to use criminal history to
engage in “a targeted screen considering at least the nature of the crime, the time elapsed, and
the nature of the job” and “then provide[] an opportunity for an individualized assessment for
people excluded by the screen to determine whether the policy as applied is job related and
consistent with business necessity”).
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ered; for example, only allowing consideration of criminal history after the
tenant has otherwise been deemed qualified. 349
CONCLUSION
Communities across the United States are beginning to acknowledge the
racially disparate impact and far-reaching harms caused by exclusions based
on criminal legal system contacts. As a result, there has been progressive
movement toward inclusion in areas including employment and political
participation. But, for the most part, we have not paid sufficient attention to
the ways contact with the criminal legal system affects people’s access to
housing. My goal in this Article was to highlight this problem by engaging
with the proliferation of crime-free ordinances. These ordinances trade on
criminal legal system contacts and effectively expel people of color, especially
Black people. This expulsion is having the effect of “Whitening” some communities and “Blackening” others, facilitating racial segregation. That, without more, is worrisome. But segregation carries with it additional harms,
including inferior education, increased crime, and under- and unemployment. Understood in this way, crime-free ordinances are an engine for racial
and economic inequality.
Failure to challenge the proliferation of crime-free housing ordinances
and adopt the proposals this Article propounds will exacerbate people of
color’s exposure to poverty, crime, over-policing, and incarceration. Ensuring the safety of all communities is critically important and should be a priority. Everyone has a right to feel safe in his or her home or community. But
crime-free housing ordinances will not make communities safer. They will
continue to divide us, further entrenching racial bias and segregation.

349. For example, New York City’s Fair Chance Act (FCA) restricts most employers’ use
of criminal history in the hiring process. N.Y.C. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGAL
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE FAIR CHANCE ACT (2016), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets
/cchr/downloads/pdf/FCA-InterpretiveGuide-112015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VT3C-ZYZW]
(outlining the requirements of the FCA). The law imposes affirmative obligations on covered
employers who want to conduct criminal background checks on job applicants and a process
that must be followed before making an adverse decision on the basis of the applicant’s criminal history. Id . at 6. Among the restrictions is the prohibition of any statement or inquiry relating to a pending arrest or criminal conviction during an interview or at any point prior to a
conditional offer being made. Id. at 3, 5.
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